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Abstract 
[Excerpt] On June 30, 2007, U.S. and South Korean trade officials signed the proposed U.S.-South Korean 
Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. If approved, the KORUS FTA would be 
the second-largest FTA that South Korea has signed to date, after the agreement with the European Union 
(EU). It would be the second-largest (next to North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA) in which the 
United States participates. South Korea is the seventhlargest trading partner of the United States and the 
United States is South Korea’s third-largest trading partner. 
Various studies conclude that the agreement would increase bilateral trade and investment flows. The 
final text of the proposed KORUS FTA covers a wide range of trade and investment issues and, therefore, 
could have substantial economic implications for both the United States and South Korea. The agreement 
will not enter into force unless Congress approves implementation legislation. The negotiations were 
conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade authority, that Congress 
granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). 
Under TPA the President has the discretion on when to submit the implementing legislation to Congress. 
President Bush did not submit the legislation because of differences with the Democratic leadership over 
treatment of autos and beef, among other issues. Early in his Administration, President Obama indicated 
the need to resolve those issues before he would submit the implementing legislation. On December 3, 
2010, after a series of arduous negotiations and missed deadlines, President Obama and President Lee 
announced that their negotiators reached agreement on modifications in the KORUS FTA, and that they 
were prepared to move ahead to getting the agreement approved by the respective legislatures. The White 
House is expected to send implementing legislation to the 112th Congress and that it would like to see 
Congress approve the agreement by July 1 of this year. 
The modifications are in the form of changes in phase-out periods for tariffs on autos, a new safeguard 
provision on autos, and concessions by South Korea on allowing a larger number of U.S. cars into South 
Korea under U.S. safety standards than was the case under the original KORUS FTA provisions. The issue 
of full U.S. beef access was not resolved because of the political sensitivity of the issue in South Korea. In 
2008, when President Lee reached a separate agreement with the United States to lift South Korea’s ban 
on U.S. beef imports, massive anti-South Korean government protests forced the two governments to 
renegotiate its terms. The U.S. beef sector has largely supported the KORUS FTA. 
A broad swath of the U.S. business community supports the KORUS FTA . With the modifications in the 
agreement reached in December, this group also includes the three Detroit-based auto manufacturers and 
the United Auto Workers (UAW) union. It still faces opposition from some labor unions and other groups, 
including Public Citizen. Many U.S. supporters view passage of the KORUS FTA as important to secure 
new opportunities in the South Korean market, while opponents claim that the KORUS FTA does not go far 
enough to break down South Korean trade barriers or that the agreement will encourage U.S. companies 
to move their production offshore at the expense of U.S. workers. Other observers have suggested the 
outcome of the KORUS FTA could have implications for the U.S.-South Korean alliance as a whole, as well 
as on U.S. Asia policy and U.S. trade policy, particularly in light of an FTA signed in by South Korea and the 
EU that is expected to go into effect on July 1, 2011. 
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Summary 
On June 30, 2007, U.S. and South Korean trade officials signed the proposed U.S.-South Korean 
Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. If approved, the KORUS 
FTA would be the second-largest FTA that South Korea has signed to date, after the agreement 
with the European Union (EU). It would be the second-largest (next to North American Free 
Trade Agreement, NAFTA) in which the United States participates. South Korea is the seventh-
largest trading partner of the United States and the United States is South Korea’s third-largest 
trading partner.  
Various studies conclude that the agreement would increase bilateral trade and investment flows. 
The final text of the proposed KORUS FTA covers a wide range of trade and investment issues 
and, therefore, could have substantial economic implications for both the United States and South 
Korea. The agreement will not enter into force unless Congress approves implementation 
legislation. The negotiations were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also 
called fast-track trade authority, that Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade 
Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210).  
Under TPA the President has the discretion on when to submit the implementing legislation to 
Congress. President Bush did not submit the legislation because of differences with the 
Democratic leadership over treatment of autos and beef, among other issues. Early in his 
Administration, President Obama indicated the need to resolve those issues before he would 
submit the implementing legislation. On December 3, 2010, after a series of arduous negotiations 
and missed deadlines, President Obama and President Lee announced that their negotiators 
reached agreement on modifications in the KORUS FTA, and that they were prepared to move 
ahead to getting the agreement approved by the respective legislatures. The White House is 
expected to send implementing legislation to the 112th Congress and that it would like to see 
Congress approve the agreement by July 1 of this year. 
The modifications are in the form of changes in phase-out periods for tariffs on autos, a new 
safeguard provision on autos, and concessions by South Korea on allowing a larger number of 
U.S. cars into South Korea under U.S. safety standards than was the case under the original 
KORUS FTA provisions. The issue of full U.S. beef access was not resolved because of the 
political sensitivity of the issue in South Korea. In 2008, when President Lee reached a separate 
agreement with the United States to lift South Korea’s ban on U.S. beef imports, massive anti-
South Korean government protests forced the two governments to renegotiate its terms. The U.S. 
beef sector has largely supported the KORUS FTA.  
A broad swath of the U.S. business community supports the KORUS FTA . With the 
modifications in the agreement reached in December, this group also includes the three Detroit-
based auto manufacturers and the United Auto Workers (UAW) union. It still faces opposition 
from some labor unions and other groups, including Public Citizen. Many U.S. supporters view 
passage of the KORUS FTA as important to secure new opportunities in the South Korean 
market, while opponents claim that the KORUS FTA does not go far enough to break down South 
Korean trade barriers or that the agreement will encourage U.S. companies to move their 
production offshore at the expense of U.S. workers. Other observers have suggested the outcome 
of the KORUS FTA could have implications for the U.S.-South Korean alliance as a whole, as 
well as on U.S. Asia policy and U.S. trade policy, particularly in light of an FTA signed in by 
South Korea and the EU that is expected to go into effect on July 1, 2011. 
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n June 30, 2007, U.S. and South Korean officials signed the proposed U.S.-South Korean 
Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries.1 If approved, the 
KORUS FTA would be the second-largest FTA South Korea has signed to date (next to 
the agreement with the European Union (EU)).2 It would be the second-largest (next to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement) in which the United States currently participates. South Korea 
is the seventh-largest trading partner of the United States and the KORUS FTA, if enacted, is 
expected to expand bilateral trade and investment flows according to some studies. 
The text of the proposed free trade agreement (FTA) covers a wide range of trade and investment 
issues and, therefore, could have wide economic implications for both the United States and 
South Korea. The subjects include ones on which the two countries achieved early agreement, 
such as the elimination on tariffs on trade in most manufactured goods and the liberalization in 
services trade. But the text also includes a number of very sensitive issues on which agreement 
was reached only during the final hours of negotiations—autos, agriculture, and trade remedies, 
among others. 
Congress will have to approve implementation legislation for the KORUS FTA before it can enter 
into force. The negotiations were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also 
called fast-track trade authority, that Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade 
Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). The authority allows the President to enter into trade 
agreements that receive expedited congressional consideration (no amendments and limited 
debate). The TPA sets no deadline for the President to submit implementing legislation to 
Congress.  
On June 26, 2010, President Obama directed U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk to work with 
his South Korean counterpart to resolve outstanding issues—primarily pertaining to autos and 
beef—on the KORUS FTA by the time he and South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak were to 
meet again in Seoul for the November 2010 G-20 meeting. The two sides failed to meet the 
deadline, but on December 3, the U.S. and South Korean leaders announced that they had reached 
agreement on modifications to the KORUS FTA.  
The modifications are mostly to auto provisions and include changes in phase-out periods for 
tariffs on autos, a new safeguard provision on autos, and concessions by South Korea on allowing 
a larger number of U.S. cars into South Korea under U.S. safety standards than was the case 
under the original KORUS FTA provisions. The issue of full U.S. beef access was not resolved 
because of the political sensitivity of the issue in South Korea. In 2008, when President Lee 
reached a separate agreement with the United States to lift South Korea’s ban on U.S. beef 
imports, massive anti-South Korean government protests forced the two governments to 
renegotiate its terms. The U.S. beef sector largely supports the KORUS FTA because of the 
projected benefits it expects to gain, if the agreement is enacted. The White House is expected to 
send implementing legislation to the 112th Congress and has indicated it would like congressional 
approval by July 1 of this year.  
                                                             
1
 For more specific information, you may contact the following CRS analysts: William Cooper, x7-7749 (general 
questions on the KORUS FTA); Michaela Platzer, x7-5037 (autos and other industrial goods); Remy Jurenas, x7-7281 
(agricultural trade); and Mark Manyin, x7-7653 (the U.S.-South Korean bilateral relationship and security issues). 
2
 On October 15, 2009, the EU and Korea initialed a free trade agreement which consists of 15 Chapters, 3 protocols 
and several annexes and appendices. The EU free trade agreement with South Korea still requires ratification by the 
European Parliament. The EU-27 market is larger than the U.S. market when measured by population (500 million vs. 
300 million) and GDP ($14.9 trillion vs. $14.4 trillion) 
O 
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Presidents Obama’s Statements on the KORUS FTA 
President Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak met for the first time on April 2, 2009, in London on 
the sidelines of the G-20 summit. Afterward, an Obama Administration official said that President Obama told Lee he 
wants to “make progress” on the agreement, and that the two leaders agreed that the two countries’ staffs should 
“discuss how to move forward.”3  
The two presidents met again on June 16, 2009, in Washington, DC. In a joint statement released at the summit, they 
said: “We will continue to deepen our strong bilateral economic, trade and investment relations. We recognize that 
the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement could further strengthen these ties and we are committed to 
working together to chart a way forward.” In answering a question at a joint press conference, President Obama 
stated, “What I have done is to affirm to [South Korean] President Lee that we want to work constructively with the 
Republic of Korea in a systematic way to clear some of these barriers that are preventing free trade from occurring 
between our two countries.”4 However, President Obama did not indicate a timeframe for consideration of 
legislation to implement the KORUS FTA.  
At a joint press conference with President Lee in Seoul in November 2009, President Obama said the agreement 
“holds out the promise of serving our mutual interests. And together, we're committed to working together to move 
the agreement forward.” President Lee said the two leaders agreed to “redouble” their efforts toward this end.5 
Prior to his meeting with President Lee, President Obama said in a Fox News interview that “I want to get the deal 
done.... Overall, I think it's a potential good deal for US exporters. But there's certain sectors of the economy that 
aren't dealt with as effectively and that's something that I'm going to be talking to President Lee about.”6 
During his January 27, 2010, State of the Union address, President Obama, without mentioning the KORUS FTA 
per se, expressed the need for the United States to strengthen its trade ties in Asia “with partners like South Korea.” 
During a question-and-answer session at the January 29, 2010, House Republican issues conference, the President 
referred to the need to seize trade opportunities, mentioning South Korea in particular. 
On June 26, 2010, President Obama announced that he would direct U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk to work 
with the South Korean trade minister to resolve outstanding issues on the KORUS FTA by the time President Obama 
and South Korean President Lee meet again in Seoul in November 2010 for the G-20 summit. The President said that 
he intends “in the few months” after the November meeting to present Congress with the implementing legislation 
for the agreement. The President made the announcement at a joint press conference following his meeting with 
President Lee prior to the G-20 summit in Toronto. 
On November 11, 2010, in Seoul, after the two presidents announced that the two sides had not resolved the 
outstanding issues, President Obama said that the U.S. and South Korean negotiating teams would be working “in the 
coming days and weeks ahead” to reach agreement. He said that an FTA “done right” would be a “win-win” for both 
countries. 
On December 4, 2010, President Obama announced that U.S. and South Korean negotiators had reached agreement 
on modifications to the KORUS FTA making the agreement a win for the United States and for “our ally and friend” 
South Korea. 
In South Korea, there is an ongoing debate over whether or not to have the National Assembly 
vote on the KORUS FTA before the agreement is submitted to Congress. South Korea’s President 
Lee Myung-bak has said he hopes to have the South Korean National Assembly pass the 
agreement soon. Lee’s Grand National Party controls a majority in the unicameral National 
Assembly, and most observers believe the agreement has the votes to pass.  
                                                             
3
 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Background Readout by Senior Administration Officials to the Travel 
Pool on the President’s Meeting with President Lee Of The Republic Of Korea,” April 2, 2009. 
4
 International Trade Daily. June 17, 2009. 
5
 White House Press Release, “Remarks by President Barack Obama and President Lee Myung-Bak of Republic of 
Korea in Joint Press Conference,” November 19, 2009. 
6
 “TRANSCRIPT: Fox News Interviews President Obama,” FOXNews.com, updated November 18, 2009. 
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The United States and South Korea entered into the KORUS FTA as a means to further solidify 
an already strong economic relationship by reducing barriers to trade and investment between 
them and to resolve long festering economic issues. The United States specifically sought 
increased access to South Korean markets for agricultural products, services, and foreign 
investment. For South Korean leaders, the KORUS FTA is a mechanism to promote reform in its 
own economy and also to gain a competitive advantage in the U.S. market for autos and other 
manufactured goods.  
Supporters of the FTA in the United States argue that failure to approve the KORUS FTA would 
allow those opportunities to slip away, particularly if Seoul’s strategy of negotiating a web of 
FTAs, with South Korea at the center, is successful. On October 6, 2010, South Korea signed its 
most prominent FTA yet with the European Union (EU).7 However, some opponents of the 
KORUS FTA argued that the agreement as originally concluded in June 2007 failed to go far 
enough in addressing South Korean trade barriers and would be a lost opportunity if approved in 
its current form. A congressionally mandated study by the United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC) concluded that investment and trade between the United States and South 
Korea would increase modestly as a result of the KORUS FTA.8 This result is in line with other 
similar studies. In general and in the short-to-medium term, the KORUS FTA’s largest 
commercial effects are expected to be microeconomic in nature. The U.S. services and agriculture 
industries, for instance, are expected to reap significant benefits if the agreement is implemented. 
Many observers have argued that in addition to its economic implications, the KORUS FTA 
would have diplomatic and security implications. For example, they have suggested that it would 
help to deepen the U.S.-South Korean alliance. The United States and South Korea have been 
allies since the United States intervened on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 and fought to repel a 
North Korean takeover of South Korea. Over 33,000 U.S. troops were killed and over 100,000 
were wounded during the three-year conflict.9 South Korea subsequently has assisted U.S. 
deployments in other conflicts, most recently by deploying over 3,000 troops to play a non-
combat role in Iraq. However, some counter this by positing that the KORUS FTA need not be 
seen as a necessary, let alone sufficient, condition for enhancing the U.S.-ROK alliance. Mutual 
interests on critical issues pertaining to North Korea and the rest of the region will continue to 
require close cooperation between the two countries in the national security sphere. Indeed, in 
many respects, the KORUS FTA’s fate may have more profound implications for U.S. trade 
policy and East Asia policy than for U.S.-South Korean relations.  
This report is designed to assist Members of Congress as they consider the costs and benefits of 
the KORUS FTA. It examines the provisions of the KORUS FTA in the context of the overall 
U.S.-South Korean economic relationship, U.S. objectives, and South Korean objectives. The 
report will be updated as events warrant. 
                                                             
7
 The Korea-EU FTA is expected to enter into force on July 1, 2011, after the two countries have completed their 
respective ratification processes. 
8
 United States International Trade Commission (USITC). U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-wide 
and Selected Sectoral Effects. Investigation No. TA-2104-24. USITC Publication 3949. September 2007. 
9
 For more on the U.S.-South Korean alliance, see CRS Report RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, 
by Larry A. Niksch. 
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The KORUS FTA in a Nutshell 
Some highlights of the results of the agreement are provided below. Background information and 
a more detailed examination of the agreement’s provisions are provided in the main sections of 
this report. 
Agriculture 
Under the KORUS FTA’s agricultural provisions, South Korea immediately would grant duty-free 
status to almost two-thirds of current U.S. agricultural exports. Tariffs and import quotas on most 
other agricultural goods would be phased out within 10 years, with a few commodities and food 
products subject to provisions that phase out such protection by year 23. However, because of 
their sensitivity, access for several U.S. products would slowly expand in perpetuity but remain 
subject to Korean import quotas. 
Much effort went into negotiating provisions covering three agricultural commodities of export 
interest to the United States. Under the KORUS FTA, South Korea agreed to eliminate its 40% 
tariff on beef muscle meats imported from the United States over a 15 year period. However, 
negotiators did not reach a breakthrough by the end of the talks on the separate but parallel issue 
of how to resolve differences on the terms of access for all U.S. beef in a way that would address 
Korea’s human health concerns arising from the 2003 discovery of mad cow disease in the U.S. 
cattle herd. Though sales of U.S. boneless beef from cattle aged less than 30 months did resume 
in April 2007 under the terms of a separate agreement reached in early 2006, sales of bone-in beef 
(e.g., ribs) only began in July 2008 after the conclusion of a difficult series of negotiations—
accompanied by widespread public protests in Korea—on a more comprehensive agreement. This 
requires the removal of specified risk materials known to transmit mad cow disease from cattle 
that are less than 30 months old when slaughtered. Both countries view this “voluntary private-
sector” arrangement as a transitional step intended to improve Korean consumer confidence in 
U.S. beef. (See Appendix A for additional information.) 
Negotiations on access for U.S. rice and oranges into the Korean market also were contentious. 
Rice was a “make-or-break” issue for Seoul, and excluded at Korea’s insistence out of U.S. 
recognition that if pushed, the talks would likely have collapsed. Special treatment for U.S. 
oranges was struck at the last moment, when negotiators compromised on a multi-part solution 
expected to increase U.S. navel orange exports over time. Korea secured an extension in the tariff 
phase-out for U.S. frozen pork in the December 2010 supplemental agreement in return for the 
changes made in the agreement’s auto and other provisions. Also, Members of Congress from 
dairy producing states have asked USTR to take steps to ensure that market access for U.S. 
cheeses in the South Korean market would not be undercut by provisions in the EU-Korea 
(KOREU) FTA. 
Automobiles 
Trade in autos and auto parts proved to be among the most difficult issues tackled by U.S. and 
South Korean negotiators. In December 2010, the U.S. and South Korea made several significant 
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changes to the 2007 agreement.10 These changes included revisions to the automotive provisions, 
which would alter the original tariff elimination schedule for passenger cars and trucks. A special 
vehicle safeguard was added. The revised agreement also increased the exemption for U.S. car 
manufacturers from South Korean standards so long as they meet U.S. federal safety standards. 
These adjustments, among others, were deemed necessary before all three U.S. automakers would 
support the KORUS FTA. Increasingly, U.S. car makers find themselves challenged by South 
Korean motor vehicle manufacturers who are seeking to increase their market share through 
imports and increased car production in the United States and other major automotive markets 
like the European Union. In negotiating the KORUS FTA, U.S. industry argued that South Korea 
should eliminate policies and practices that seemingly discriminate against U.S. auto imports. 
Another apparent objective was to safeguard the U.S. market from a possible surge in South 
Korea auto imports. A detailed discussion of the auto-specific provisions is provided later in this 
report. A few of the most important provisions are highlighted below: 
• The December 2010 agreement adjusts the tariff elimination schedule for 
passenger cars and trucks. A longer phase-out period was a key priority for Ford 
Motor Company and the United Auto Workers (UAW). The United States and 
South Korea agreed to delay the full elimination of their respective tariffs on 
passenger cars of 2.5% and 8% until year five after KORUS FTA 
implementation, rather than remove the tariffs immediately as agreed in 2007. 
South Korea would reduce its passenger car tariff to 4% immediately upon entry 
into force of the FTA. A notable exception is the acceleration of the phase-out of 
tariff rates on electric cars and hybrid vehicles, a possible new market for U.S. 
and South Korean automakers. Electric car tariffs would be phased out over five 
years instead of 10 years as negotiated in the 2007 KORUS FTA.11 The United 
States would keep its 25% truck tariff in place for a longer period than under the 
2007 agreement. It would remain for eight years and would be phased out 
completely by year 10. South Korea kept its commitment to immediately 
eliminate its 10% duty on U.S. trucks. The snapback provision would allow the 
U.S. to reapply the 2.5% passenger car tariff once the tariffs have been phased 
out under the FTA if U.S. automakers claim that South Korea is in violation of 
the KORUS FTA agreement. The snapback does not extend to the 25% truck 
tariff. Snapback would be extended to violations of new safety and 
environmental standards. 
• Several other significant auto-specific changes were also part of the revised 2010 
agreement. For the first time, both sides agreed to a special motor vehicle 
safeguard. It would allow the United States to take action if there are “any 
harmful surges in Korean auto imports due to the agreement.” As a remedy under 
the auto-specific safeguard, the U.S. would be able to re-impose the 2.5% tariff 
and the 25% truck tariff which would be phased out under the KORUS FTA. 
South Korean auto manufacturers have substantially increased their production in 
the United States since 2005, so it seems unlikely that there would be a surge in 
automobile imports from South Korea. Reportedly, U.S. vehicle production at 
                                                             
10
 In the December 2010 press release, USTR refers to the 2010 amendments as a “supplemental agreement.” Some 
international trade observers note that by referring to the revisions as a “supplemental agreement” it might fall outside 
the original 2007 agreement which has been changed by the 2010 pact.  
11
 In the original 2007 agreement the United States and South Korea had agreed to phase out their respective electric 
car tariffs of 2.5% and 8%, respectively, over 10 years.  
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South Korean auto manufacturers’ U.S. plants is estimated at 450,000 in 2010, an 
increase from 210,000 in 2009.12 The 2010 agreement also substantially 
increased the threshold in the number of automobiles U.S. automakers could 
export to South Korea if they meet U.S. federal safety standards. The exemption 
was raised from a ceiling of 6,500 per U.S. automaker per year to as many as 
25,000 cars per U.S. automaker per year. Whether foreign-owned automakers 
with U.S.-based production such as BMW, Daimler, or Nissan could also qualify 
for this exemption if they export directly from the United States to South Korea 
is unclear. The revised agreement also permits U.S. automakers to be considered 
in compliance with new South Korean fuel economy and greenhouse gas 
emissions standards if they achieve targets within 19% of those in South Korea’s 
new regulations.  
Other Key Provisions 
The KORUS FTA would cover a broad range of other areas. According to the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR), most U.S.-South Korean trade in consumer and 
industrial products would become duty-free within three years after the agreement enters into 
force, and virtually all remaining tariffs would be lifted within 10 years. The two countries agreed 
to liberalize trade in services by opening up their markets beyond what they have committed to do 
in the World Trade Organization (WTO). About 60% of U.S.-South Korea trade in textiles and 
apparel would become duty-free immediately, and the KORUS FTA would provide a special 
safeguard mechanism to reduce the impact of textile and apparel import surges.  
Trade remedies were a critical issue for South Korea and a sensitive issue for the United States. 
The FTA allows for the United States to exempt imports from South Korea from a “global” 
escape clause (section 201) measure if they are not a major cause of serious injury or a threat of 
serious injury to the U.S. domestic industry. The FTA would also provide for a binational 
consultative committee to review trade remedy decisions involving one another.13 
In addition, South Korea and the United States agreed to establish an independent body, a 
Medicines and Medical Devices Committee, to review recommendations and determinations 
regarding South Korean pricing and government reimbursement for pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices and to improve transparency in the process for making those determinations. 
Furthermore, one year after the KORUS FTA enters into force, a binational committee would be 
formed to study the possibility of eventually including products from “Outward Processing 
Zones,” such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, that use North Korean labor. 
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Estimates of the Overall Economic Effects of a 
KORUS FTA 
Economists have released several studies estimating the potential effects of the KORUS FTA. As 
required by the TPA statute, the USITC conducted a study in 2007 of the KORUS FTA at the 
request of the President.14 The USITC study concludes that U.S. GDP would increase by $10.1 
billion to $11.9 billion (approximately 0.1%) if the KORUS FTA is fully implemented, a 
negligible amount given the size of the U.S. economy. The USITC based this estimate primarily 
on the removal of tariffs and tariff-rate-quotas, that is, barriers that can be relatively easily 
quantified. The study concludes that U.S. exports of goods would likely increase by $9.7 billion 
to $10.9 billion, primarily in agricultural products, machinery, electronics, transportation 
equipment, including passenger vehicles and parts. U.S. imports would increase $6.4 billion to 
$6.9 billion, primarily in textiles, apparel, leather products, footwear, machinery, electronics, and 
passenger vehicles and parts.15 
The range does not take into account the impact of the reduction of barriers to trade in services 
and to foreign investment flows and the impact of changes in regulations as a result of the 
KORUS FTA. The study notes that U.S. exports in services would increase as a result of South 
Korean commitments under the KORUS FTA, and that changes in the regulatory environment in 
both countries would also help to increase bilateral trade and investment flows. 
The study estimates that changes in aggregate U.S. employment would be negligible given the 
much larger size of the U.S. economy compared to the South Korean economy. However, while 
some sectors, such as livestock producers, would experience increases in employment, others 
such as textile, wearing apparel, and electronic equipment manufacturers would be expected to 
experience declines in employment.16 
Other studies draw the same basic conclusions, although the magnitudes differ because they 
employ different models from the USITC study. For example, a University of Michigan analysis 
commissioned by the Korea Economic Institute estimates that U.S. GDP would increase by 
$25.12 billion (0.14% of U.S. GDP). This is larger than the USITC estimate, but in part this is 
because its authors quantified the effects of liberalization in services trade.17 The authors also 
analyzed the impact of a KORUS FTA before the final text had been released and assumed, 
among other things, that rice trade would be liberalized, which, in the end, was not the case. 
In December 2005, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) published a 
study measuring the potential economic impact of a U.S.-South Korean FTA on South Korea 
alone. The study estimated some of the dynamic, or long-run, economic effects in addition to the 
static, or one-time, effects of the FTA on South Korea. The KIEP study estimated that the FTA 
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 Section 2104(f) Trade of 2002. P.L. 107-210. United States International Trade Commission (USITC). U.S.-Korea 
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would eventually lead to a 0.42% to 0.59% increase in South Korea’s GDP according to a static 
analysis, and 1.99% to 2.27% according to a dynamic analysis.18 
An Overview of the U.S.-South Korean 
Economic Relationship 
South Korea is a major economic partner for the United States. In 2010, two-way trade between 
the two countries totaled $86.9 billion, making South Korea the United States’ seventh-largest 
trading partner. (See Table 1.) South Korea is among the United States’ largest markets for 
agricultural products. Major U.S. exports to South Korea include semiconductors, machinery 
(particularly semiconductor production machinery), aircraft, and agricultural products. 
Table 1. Annual U.S.-South Korea Merchandise Trade, 
Selected Years 
(billions of U.S. dollars) 
Year  U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Trade balance Total trade 
1990 14.4 18.5 -4.1 32.9 
1995 25.4 24.2 1.2 49.6 
2000 26.3 39.8 -13.5 66.1 
2003 22.5 36.9 -14.4 59.5 
2004 25.0 45.1 -20.1 70.1 
2005 26.2 43.2 -17.0 69.4 
2006 30.8 44.7 -13.9 75.5 
2007 33.0 45.4 -12.4 78.4 
2008 33.1 46.7 -13.6 79.8 
2009 27.0 38.7 -11.7 65.7 
2010 38.0 48.9 -10.9 86.9 
Major U.S. Export Items Industrial machinery; chemicals; semiconductor circuits; corn & wheat; specialized 
instruments.  
Major U.S. Import Items Cell phones; semiconductor circuits; cars & car parts; iron & steel. 
Sources: 1990 and 1995 data from Global Trade Information Services. 2000-2008 data from U.S. International Trade 
Commission. The 2000-2010 U.S. export data are for U.S. domestic exports and the data for U.S. imports are for 
imports on a consumption basis. 
South Korea is far more dependent economically on the United States than the United States is on 
South Korea. In 2010, the United States was South Korea’s third-largest trading partner, second-
largest export market, and the third-largest source of imports. It was among South Korea’s largest 
suppliers of foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2003, China for the first time displaced the United 
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States from its perennial place as South Korea’s number one trading partner. In 2005 Japan 
overtook the United States to become South Korea’s second-largest trade partner. 
Table 2. Asymmetrical Economic Interdependence (2010) 
 Total Trade Export Market Source of Imports Source of FDI 
 For the U.S., South Korea ranks # 7 # 8 # 7 # 16 (2008)  
 For South Korea, U.S. ranks # 3 # 2 # 3 # 2 (2007) 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bank of Korea. 
Increased economic interaction between the United States and South Korea has been 
accompanied by numerous disagreements over trade policies. In general, U.S. exporters and trade 
negotiators identify the lack of transparency of South Korea’s trading and regulatory systems as 
the most significant barriers to trade with South Korea in almost every major product sector. 
Many U.S. government officials also complain that Seoul continues to use government 
regulations and standard-setting powers to discriminate against foreign firms in politically 
sensitive industries, such as automobiles and telecommunications. Another major cross-sectoral 
complaint is that rigidities in the South Korean labor market, such as mandatory severance pay, 
raise the cost of investing and doing business. Finally, the United States and other countries have 
pressed South Korea to open further its agricultural market, which is considered one of the most 
closed among members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).19 Many of these issues arose during the KORUS FTA negotiations. 
The intensity of these disputes has diminished considerably since the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
in part because South Korea enacted a set of sweeping market-oriented reforms as a quid pro quo 
for receiving a U.S.-led $58 billion package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
following the near collapse of the South Korean economy in 1997. In particular, as a result of the 
reforms, South Korea opened its doors to foreign investors, ushering in billions of dollars of 
foreign portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI). The result is that foreign companies, 
including U.S. firms, now are significant shareholders in many prominent industrial 
conglomerates (chaebol); at one point earlier in the decade, foreign firms owned about one-third 
of the South Korean banking industry and an estimated 40% of the value of the shares traded on 
South Korea’s stock exchange. Since the 1997 crisis, FDI commitments by U.S. companies have 
totaled over $25 billion.20 
Additionally, the United States and South Korea appear to have become more adept at managing 
their trade disputes. This may be partly due to the quarterly, working-level “trade action agenda” 
trade meetings that were initiated in early 2001. Both sides credit the meetings, which appear to 
be unique to the U.S.-South Korean trade relationship, with creating a more constructive dialogue 
that helped pave the way for the two sides to feel sufficiently confident to launch FTA 
negotiations. 
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U.S. and South Korean Objectives in an FTA 
U.S. and South Korean policymakers shared certain goals in launching and completing the 
negotiations on the KORUS FTA. Both governments saw in the FTA a logical extension of an 
already important economic relationship that would provide a means by which the two trading 
partners could address and resolve fundamental issues and, thereby, raise the relationship to a 
higher level. For the United States these issues have included the high tariffs and other 
restrictions on agricultural imports. For South Korea, these difficult issues have included 
perceived U.S. discrimination toward South Korean imports in the application of trade remedies 
and treatment of products made at the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea. 
While sharing some broad objectives, U.S. and South Korean leaders also approached the 
KORUS FTA from different perspectives that were reflected in the conduct and outcome of the 
negotiations. A primary objective of the United States was to gain access to South Korean 
markets in agricultural products, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, some other high-
technology manufactured goods, and services, particularly financial and professional services—
areas in which U.S. producers are internationally competitive but for which South Korean barriers 
seemed to be high. 
For South Korea, gaining a large increase in market access was not as critical a priority since 
South Korean exporters already have a significant presence in areas in which they have proved to 
be competitive—consumer electronics and autos, for example, and in which they already face 
only low or zero U.S. tariffs. However, South Korea arguably did seek to preserve its share of the 
U.S. market in the face of growing competition from emerging East Asian producers from 
Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and possibly China. South Korea likely also aimed to improve its 
competitive position in the U.S. market vis-à-vis Japan where the elimination of even low tariffs 
might give South Korean exporters some price advantage. 
Launching the FTA negotiations was largely at the initiative of South Korea. Its main objective in 
securing an FTA with the United States was much broader than gaining reciprocal access to the 
U.S. market. Entering an FTA with the United States meshed with a number of former South 
Korean President Roh Moo-hyun’s long-term economic and strategic goals. Roh made an FTA the 
top economic priority for the remainder of his tenure, which expired in February 2008.21 Soon 
after his election in 2002, Roh committed himself to raising South Korea’s per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) to $20,000 by the end of the decade and to transforming South Korea 
into a major “economic hub” in Northeast Asia by expanding the economic reforms begun by his 
predecessor following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Ongoing competitive pressure from 
Japanese firms, increased competition from Chinese enterprises, and the rapid ageing of the South 
Korean workforce has heightened the sense of urgency about boosting national competitiveness. 
Continuing along this line of argument, ex-Prime Minister Han Duk-soo has said that a failure to 
adopt significant economic changes will mean that “Korea’s long term growth potential is likely 
to deteriorate.”22 Lee Myung-bak, who was elected President in December 2007, made the 
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economy the centerpiece of his campaign and has supported the KORUS FTA as part of a larger 
program to promote South Korean economic growth. 
During the negotiations, South Korean officials and other South Korean proponents of the 
KORUS FTA tended not to focus on the increased access to the U.S. market. Rather, they 
emphasized the medium and long-term gains that would stem from increased allocative efficiency 
of the South Korean economy, particularly in the services industries. This would presumably be 
brought about by an influx of U.S. investment and technology into South Korea and by the spur 
of increased competition with U.S. firms.23 Senior officials in particular emphasized the need to 
boost the competitiveness of South Korean service industries. An FTA with the United States, 
they argued, will help address South Korea’s increased economic polarization by spurring job 
creation in fields such as medical, legal, education, and accounting services in a free trade 
agreement.24 Some, however, say an FTA will worsen South Korea’s income gap.25 Also, during 
the talks, there were continuous and often large scale anti-FTA protests, generally led by South 
Korean farmers and trade unionists. 
The absence of mirror-image or reciprocal U.S. and South Korean objectives in the negotiations 
is reflected in the structure of the KORUS FTA. Except for some provisions dealing with issues 
specific to U.S.-South Korea economic relations, for example, South Korea taxation of autos and 
the Kaesong industrial complex, the structure of the KORUS FTA largely resembles the structure 
of other FTAs, such as Dominican Republic-Central American FTA (DR-CAFTA), that the United 
States has entered into. This conclusion does not suggest that South Korea did not bring to the 
table its own specific demands, which it did (such as the exclusion of rice) and held to them 
firmly. 
Sector-Specific Issues and the KORUS FTA 
Under the KORUS FTA, U.S. and South Korean negotiators addressed a number of sector-
specific issues. Some issues, such as elimination of tariffs on most manufactured goods, were not 
very controversial and were dealt with in early stages of the negotiations. Other issues, such as 
trade in agricultural products and in autos, were the most difficult and were not completed until 
the final hours of the 2007 negotiations. The two sides signed the agreement on June 30, 2007. In 
December 2010, U.S. and South Korean negotiators agreed to modifications to the KORUS FTA, 
pertaining largely to the auto trade, in order to assuage concerns raised by some members of the 
auto sector and Members of Congress. 
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Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Issues 
Overview 
Attaining comprehensive market access for U.S. agricultural products to South Korea’s large 
market and finding a way to resolve Korea’s continued restrictions on U.S. beef purchases 
(imposed to protect human health following the late 2003 discovery of mad cow disease in the 
U.S. cattle herd) were the two primary objectives pursued by U.S. agricultural negotiators. 
Though South Korea ranks among the leading agricultural importing countries in the world, its 
farm sector is highly protected with high tariffs and quotas.26 This reflects its farmers’ long-
standing political influence (particularly that of rice producers) and its urban population’s deep 
ties to its rural roots. 
In concluding the KORUS FTA on April 1, 2007, the United States secured nearly complete 
access for all U.S. agricultural commodities and food products into Korea’s market. However, a 
breakthrough on the beef issue (technically not part of the FTA talks but nevertheless the subject 
of high-level discussions) did not occur until June 2008. This reflected the then newly elected 
Korean President Lee’s view that an agreement spelling out the rules that apply to beef imports 
from the United States had to be in place before President Bush would consider sending this 
agreement to Capitol Hill. Several Members of Congress had for months stated that South Korea 
must agree to fully reopen its market to U.S. beef under scientifically based international rules 
and in commercially significant quantities before Congress considers or approves the agreement. 
U.S. agricultural groups, well aware of this deal’s potential benefits for producers, had then also 
conditioned their support on the resumption of U.S. beef exports. 
More recently, the late 2010 negotiations to address outstanding FTA issues did not result in the 
full opening of South Korea’s market to U.S. beef as sought by the Obama Administration and 
some Members of Congress. The only change made to the agreement’s agricultural provisions is a 
concession (among others) requested by South Korea in return for changes sought by USTR in 
the auto provisions. The United States accepted a two-year extension in the phasing out of 
Korea’s tariff on the largest category of pork imports from the United States. Responding to the 
conclusion of these talks, the U.S. beef and pork sectors have expressed their support for the 
KORUS FTA, emphasizing that its approval as soon as possible is vital to realizing the gains 
negotiated before other countries’ FTAs with South Korea take effect.  
In 2010, South Korea was the fifth-largest market for U.S. agriculture, as export sales totaled $5.3 
billion. Under the KORUS FTA’s agricultural provisions, South Korea immediately would grant 
duty-free status to almost two-thirds of current U.S. agricultural exports. Tariffs and tariff-rate 
quotas (TRQs)27 on most other agricultural goods would be phased out within 10 years, with a 
few commodities and food products subject to provisions that phase out such protection by year 
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 South Korea’s average applied agricultural tariff in 2009 was almost 49%, compared to 4.7% for the United States, 
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23. Seven U.S. products (skim and whole milk powders, evaporated milk, in-season oranges, 
potatoes for table use, honey, and identity-preserved soybeans for food use) would be subject to 
Korean import quotas that slowly expand in perpetuity. However, the agreement does not give 
U.S. rice and rice products additional access to South Korea’s market (see below).28 
With the immediate elimination or phase-out of most of South Korea’s relatively high agricultural 
trade barriers under the KORUS FTA, the U.S. agricultural and food processing sectors would 
noticeably benefit from additional exports. The USITC estimates that the increase in U.S. exports 
of agricultural commodities and processed foods would account for up to one-third of the entire 
projected increase in total U.S. exports to South Korea’s market once the KORUS FTA’s 
provisions are fully implemented. Sale of agricultural products would be from $1.9 billion to $3.8 
billion (44% to 89%) higher than exports under a no-agreement scenario. Almost half of this 
export increase would accrue to the U.S. beef sector, based on the USITC’s assumption that U.S. 
beef exports recover to the level before South Korea imposed its restrictions import in late 2003. 
(For information on the mid-2008 agreement on Korean rules that now apply to U.S. beef 
imports, see Appendix A.) About 20% of the export increase would benefit U.S. producers and 
exporters of pork, poultry and other meat products.29 In another analysis, the American Farm 
Bureau Federation (AFBF) projects that U.S. agricultural exports by the end of the transition 
period (2027) would be more than $1.5 billion (45%) higher under the KORUS FTA than would 
be the case otherwise. Sales of beef, poultry, and pork would account for $644 million (or 42%) 
of this increase.30 
Because South Korean agricultural exports to the United States are small ($298 million in 2010) 
and largely complementary, there was no controversy in negotiating access to the U.S. market. 
The United States agreed to phase out tariffs and quotas on all agricultural imports from South 
Korea under seven phase-out periods ranging up to 15 years. One 10-year TRQ would apply to 
imports of fluid milk and cream, among other specified dairy products. The USITC projects that 
imports of agricultural products (primarily processed food products) from South Korea under the 
KORUS FTA would be from $52 million to $78 million (12% to 18%) higher than such imports 
under a no-agreement scenario. 
Beef 
Under the KORUS FTA, South Korea agreed to eliminate its 40% tariff on beef muscle meats 
imported from the United States over a 15-year period. Also, South Korea would have the right to 
impose safeguard tariffs on a temporary basis in response to any potential surge in imports of 
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U.S. beef meats above specified levels. The trigger for this additional tariff would be 270,000 
metric tons (MT) in year 1, which would increase 2% annually; in year 15, the trigger would be 
354,000 MT.31 In year 16, this protective mechanism would no longer apply. The 18% tariff on 
imports of beef offals (tongues, livers, tails, and feet), and tariffs ranging from 22.5% to 72% on 
other beef products, would also be eliminated in 15 years. 
Assuming that South Korea fully lifts its restrictions on U.S. beef and bilateral beef trade returns 
to normal, the USITC estimates that the phase-out of South Korea’s beef tariff and safeguard 
could increase U.S. beef exports from about $600 million to almost $1.8 billion (58% to 165%) 
above what would be the case otherwise. Under the KORUS FTA, the AFBF projects that U.S. 
beef sales would be $265 million higher as the United States recaptures its historic share of the 
South Korean market. However, its analysis notes that the market share of U.S. beef likely will 
not increase over time. That is because South Korean tastes have developed a preference for 
grass-fed Australian beef, according to the AFBF, and will continue to be competitive in price 
against U.S. beef even with the current 40% tariff removed. 
On June 21, 2008, U.S. and South Korean negotiators reached agreement on the requirements that 
now apply to Korean imports of U.S. beef and beef products. Imports of boneless and in-bone 
beef, and other beef products, from cattle less than 30 months of age are allowed entry, but are 
subject to various conditions that U.S. beef exporters and the U.S. government must meet. This 
agreement occurred against the backdrop of mounting public protests in Korea against an earlier 
agreement, calls by opposition parties that the initial terms be renegotiated, and the Korean 
President’s apologies for how his government mishandled this matter. The Korean government 
secured these additional changes in order to allay public concerns about the safety of U.S. beef. 
Since mid-July 2008, U.S. beef sales have resumed and increased on a year-over-year basis. 
Future U.S. beef exports will depend the pact at which Korean consumers resume purchases in 
light of the controversy that swirled around this issue, and on the extent that the U.S. dollar 
remains weak against the currencies of other beef exporting countries (e.g., Australia). (See 
Appendix A for additional details.) 
Rice 
South Korean negotiators succeeded in excluding the entry of U.S. rice on preferential terms—its 
prime objective in negotiating agriculture in the KORUS FTA. This reflects Korea’s efforts to 
maintain its stated policy of self-sufficiency in rice production, the national sentiment that 
preserving rice production is inseparable from the country’s identity, and the political reality that 
rice farming preserves the basis for economic activity in the countryside. That rice was a make-
or-break issue for Seoul is seen in the comment made by a top U.S. trade official, Deputy United 
States Trade Representative Karan Bhatia, the day after the talks concluded: “Ultimately, the 
question that confronted us was whether to accept a very, very good albeit less perfect agreement 
or to lose the entire agreement because South Korea refused to move on rice.”32 On rice, the 
KORUS FTA would only require South Korea to continue to abide by its multilateral trade 
commitments to increase rice imports. 
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At present, U.S. rice exporters have access to the South Korean market under (1) a 24% share 
(50,076 MT) of the rice import quota established under that country’s multilateral World Trade 
Organization (WTO) commitments in 1995, and (2) a separate quota available to all countries.33 
Rice entering under both quotas faces a 5% tariff. Entries above each quota are prohibited—a 
unique concession that South Korea received in the 1993 Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. U.S. rice exports against both quotas have fluctuated, but since 2005 have risen to 
reach $76 million (107,905 MT) in 2008. Future U.S. sales are expected to grow slowly in line 
with the expansion of the most recently established rice quota. 
Though the U.S. rice industry expressed disappointment with the rice exclusion, the United States 
will have other opportunities to negotiate access for additional U.S. rice in Korea’s market. A 
further opening of the South Korean rice market could occur in the process of concluding a 
multilateral agreement to further liberalize agricultural trade in the WTO’s Doha Development 
Round. Also, the United States and other rice exporting countries could press for additional 
access when Korea’s current multilateral rice access provisions expire in 2014. 
Oranges 
Differences on how quickly to liberalize trade in fresh oranges were not resolved until just before 
the negotiations concluded. The United States sought the complete elimination of Korea’s border 
protection on all citrus products, while South Korea wanted to retain its quotas and tariffs, 
primarily because of the importance of the citrus industry to the economy of Cheju Island. At 
present, South Korea imposes a 50% tariff on all imports of oranges, irrespective of whether they 
enter within or outside an existing TRQ. 
In reaching a compromise, negotiators agreed to a multi-part solution. First, a small duty-free 
quota would be created for “in-season” U.S. navel oranges (a variety that is not produced in 
Korea) that would enter between September 1 and the end of February—a period that coincides 
with the Island’s unshu (mandarin) orange harvest season. The initial 2,500 MT TRQ would 
increase at a compound 3% annual rate in perpetuity. Shipments in excess of the quota amount 
during this six-month period would continue to be subject to the 50% tariff. Second, in the first 
year, this high tariff would be reduced to 30% for “out-of-season” oranges that enter between 
March 1 and August 31, and then be completely phased out in stages by year 7. Third, South 
Korea’s 144% tariff on other mandarin oranges would be phased out over 15 years. 
The cost of selling to what already is a leading U.S. export market for fresh oranges would be 
significantly reduced as Korea’s high 50% tariff is phased out. In 2010, South Korea ranked 
second (after Canada), with U.S. orange sales totaling $114 million (118,945 MT). The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that the value of the in-season 2,500 MT quota and 
tariff reductions on all orange exports in the first year that the agreement is in effect would be 
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almost $18 million. Over seven years, USDA estimates the cumulative value of savings 
associated with these orange access provisions at $208 million.34 
Pork 
As revised by the December 2010 supplemental agreement, the KORUS FTA would phase out 
South Korea’s 25% tariff on 90% of the U.S. pork (primarily frozen product) now shipped to that 
market by January 1, 2016. This is two years longer than what both sides had agreed upon in the 
2007 text (i.e., January 1, 2014). Korea’s 22.5% tariff on other U.S. pork products (e.g., fresh 
pork bellies and miscellaneous fresh cuts) would be eliminated over 10 years. South Korea 
secured a safeguard to protect against import surges of these fresh pork products, which would 
expire at the end of 10 years.  
In 2010, South Korea was the fourth-largest market for U.S. pork (fresh, chilled and frozen), with 
sales of almost 84,000 MT valued at $161 million. The National Pork Producers Council 
acknowledged that, even with the last minute concession on pork in order to resolve the auto 
issue, the KORUS FTA is “a good deal.” It expects the agreement to “be one of the most lucrative 
for the U.S. pork industry,” with a substantial increase projected in exports to South Korea, live 
hog prices, and direct jobs.35 
Geographical Indications for Dairy Products 
The U.S. dairy sector has expressed concern that the geographical indications (GI) provisions that 
apply to various EU cheeses in the KOREU FTA would undercut the potential benefits negotiated 
under the KORUS FTA for U.S. cheeses with identical names that sell into the Korean market. 
GIs (similar to a trademark) refer to marks that “identify a good as originating in the territory of a 
country, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other 
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”36 To illustrate, 
“champagne” and “Idaho potatoes” are examples of GI designations.Products so designated are 
eligible for relief from acts of infringement and/or unfair competition under a country’s trademark 
laws and regulations. Because GIs are commercially valuable in the international trade of 
agricultural products, wines, and spirits, the EU in negotiating its bilateral trade agreements has 
sought to secure additional protection for its GI-designated agricultural and beverage products in 
FTA-partner country markets beyond what multilateral trading rules currently provide.  
More than 50 Members of the House requested the USTR to ensure that as South Korea develops 
regulations to implement the KOREU FTA’s GI provisions, those rules “do not undercut the dairy 
market gains secured” in the KORUS FTA. They expressed concern that the U.S. dairy industry 
will not be able to increase cheese exports if (1) the United States does not “combat European 
efforts to carve out the sole right for their producers to use … cheese names most familiar to 
consumers around the world (e.g., feta, gorgonzola, muenster, parmesan, provolone),” and (2) act 
to safeguard against possible threats to the use of such generic terms as cheddar and mozzarella 
“that could arise as a result of recent EU legal precedents” to protect the names of some EU wines 
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and spirits. USTR has held talks on this matter separate from those that concluded in the 
supplemental agreement, and reportedly is still working on solutions to address the concerns.37 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Provisions 
As found in most other U.S. FTAs, the KORUS FTA establishes a bilateral standing committee to 
address food safety and animal/plant life or health issues that frequently emerge in agricultural 
trade. However, there are no commodity-specific sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) provisions to 
address outstanding issues, such as Korea’s import health requirements on U.S. beef imports or 
Korean standards that have prevented sales of some U.S. horticultural products to that market. 
The Committee on SPS Matters would serve as a forum to implement the WTO’s Agreement on 
the Application of SPS Measures, enhance mutual understanding of each country’s SPS rules, 
resolve future bilateral SPS disputes that arise, coordinate technical assistance programs, and 
consult on issues and positions in the WTO and other international bodies where SPS issues are 
considered. The text of the SPS chapter specifically states that neither the United States nor South 
Korea has recourse to pursue dispute settlement to address any SPS issue that arises. Instead, any 
matter would be resolved using the formal process established under the WTO’s SPS Agreement. 
U.S. beef producers had argued until the 2008 bilateral agreement was reached that Korea’s 
stance on U.S. beef imports must be scientifically based upon internationally recognized 
guidelines issued by the World Organization for Animal Health, also known as OIE by its French 
acronym.38 Other agricultural groups also have raised concerns about Korea’s implementation of 
SPS measures on food additives and those that have restricted U.S. fruit and vegetable exports. 
This new standing committee potentially could be used as the venue to attempt to resolve future 
SPS disputes, taking into account latest available scientific findings and knowledge. 
Autos 
The U.S. and South Korea revised parts of the 2007 KORUS FTA on trade in automobiles in 
December 2010. The Obama Administration claimed this was a necessary step in moving the 
agreement forward because “the [original] U.S.-Korea trade agreement did not go far enough to 
provide new market access to U.S. auto companies and to level the playing field for U.S. auto 
manufacturers and workers.”39  
The main automotive trade provisions, including the December 2010 revisions, may be 
summarized as follows: 
• Elimination of South Korean tariffs on U.S.-made motor vehicles. South Korea 
would immediately reduce its 8% tariff on U.S.-built passenger cars, including 
electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids, to 4% and would immediately reduce its 
10% tariff on trucks to zero.40 In year five, tariffs on U.S.-made motor vehicles, 
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 White House. “Increasing U.S. Auto Exports and Growing U.S. Auto Jobs Through the U.S.-Korea Trade 
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including electric cars and plug-in hybrids, would be reduced to zero.41 Tariffs 
would be immediately reduced to zero in each country for auto parts imported 
from the other.42 
• Elimination of U.S. tariffs on South Korean-made automobiles and a “snapback” 
clause. The United States would keep its car tariff (which would also cover 
electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles) of 2.5% in place for five years. In the 
original agreement, the tariff would have been eliminated immediately on 
imports of South Korean cars with small gas engines. Tariffs on cars with larger 
gas engines and diesel engines would be phased out over over three years. The 
elimination of the 25% duty on trucks, a residual rate dating from an earlier trade 
dispute with Europe, would be delayed. It would stay in place for the first seven 
years after the agreement is ratified and would then be phased out in equal 
installments in years 8, 9, and 10 based on the 2010 revision.43 The FTA, in 
Annex 22-A, also establishes a special bilateral dispute settlement panel, 
designed to resolve automotive issues within six months. “If the panel finds a 
violation of an auto-related commitment or the nullification/impairment of 
expected benefits, the complaining Party may suspend its tariff concessions on 
passenger cars and assess duties at the prevailing MFN rate (i.e., ‘snapback’ any 
tariff reductions provided by the FTA).”44 The USITC notes in its 2007 report on 
the KORUS FTA that, “The dispute settlement provisions restrict the [U.S.] 
snapback penalty on light trucks ... to the rate for passenger cars, 2.5%,” while 
South Korea could snapback to 8%.45 The renegotiated agreement does not 
extend the snapback to the higher 25% truck tariff, but it does appear the 
revisions would strengthen the snapback with the White House fact sheet stating 
“the 2010 supplemental agreement substantially increases Korea’s obligations in 
a number of areas subject to this strong enforcement mechanism.” 
• Reduction of alleged discriminatory effects of engine displacement taxes. 
Automotive-specific taxes, which play an important role in determining the final 
price of a vehicle, are viewed by U.S. automakers as another barrier to foreign 
car sales in South Korea. The U.S. complaint centers on South Korea’s steeply 
ascending vehicle tax schedule, with very high rates on vehicles with larger 
engine capacities such as might be exported by U.S. producers, makes U.S. 
imported cars more expensive than smaller South Korean cars. Moreover, the tax 
system has a “cascade” effect, so that subsequent taxation rates incorporate, for 
example, the 8% duty paid on an imported vehicle. Currently, a special 
consumption tax, an educational tax, a value-added tax, a registration tax, and a 
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 Tariffs for electric cars and plug-in hybrids would be phased out over five years, whereas passenger car tariffs would 
remain in place at 2.5% until year five.  
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 Office of USTR. Report of Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Automotive and Capital Goods (ITAC 2) (April 
27, 2007), p. 2. 
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 The 2007 agreement would have required the U.S. to begin phasing out its 25% tariff on light truck imports until full 
elimination in year 10 following implementation of KORUS FTA.  
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 USTR, “Auto-Related Provisions,” p. 1; USITC. U.S.-Korea FTA, p. 3-80 (Box 3-4). 
45United States International Trade Commission. U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-Wide and 
Selected Sectoral Effects. USITC Publication 3949. p. 3-82 and Box 3.4, September 2007.  
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subway bond are among the taxes which apply to motor vehicles, and these taxes 
are often higher on vehicles with engines 2,000 cubic centimeters (cc) or larger.46 
In the renegotiated 2010 agreement, South Korea agreed to “additional 
transparency” on tax treatment of U.S. automobiles.47  
• Improved regulatory transparency for new automotive regulations. South Korea 
also committed to an improvement in its regulatory process in two ways. U.S. 
auto companies would be given one year between the time a final regulation 
relating to autos is issued and when U.S. automakers must comply with the new 
regulation. South Korea also agreed to develop a new post-implementation 
review system within two years after the agreement takes effect to ensure that 
existing auto regulations are applied in the least burdensome manner possible.  
• Regulations on harmonization of automotive safety and environmental standards 
U.S. manufacturers complain that South Korea sets automotive safety and 
environmental regulations in a manner that is closed to outsiders and not 
transparent. This results in standards idiosyncratic to South Korea. South Korean-
based producers, who hold the lion’s share of the domestic market, can afford to 
operate one line for domestic production, and another for export. Foreign 
companies have difficulty affording the high unit cost of customizing a small 
number of vehicles for the South Korean market.48 This problem is addressed in 
the KORUS FTA (Chapter 9—”Technical Barriers to Trade”) and in an exchange 
of “confirmation letters” of June 30, 2007, between USTR Susan Schwab and 
South Korean Trade Minister Hyun Chung Kim. The revised 2010 agreement 
provides for self-certification to U.S. federal safety standards for a limited 
number of U.S.-exported vehicles raising the ceiling to 25,000 per automaker per 
year, or 75,000 American-built cars each year, compared to no more than 6,500 
per year per U.S. automotive manufacturer as agreed to in 2007, which would 
have totaled 19,500 vehicles combined. Under the revised 2010 KORUS FTA 
agreement, U.S. auto manufacturers would be given exemptions from meeting 
new higher South Korean environmental standards.49 U.S. automakers would be 
considered in compliance with new South Korean fuel economy and greenhouse 
gas emissions standards if “they achieve targets within 19% of those in South 
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 One measurement of car engines is displacement. An engine in cubic centimeters shows the volumes displaced by 
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Korea’s new regulations.”50 This provision applies to U.S. carmakers that sold 
fewer than 4,500 cars in South Korea in calendar year 2009.  
• Creation of an “Automotive Working Group.” Under terms of Annex 9-B, the 
two parties agreed to create an Automotive Working Group, which would meet at 
least annually, and would review and resolve “issues with respect to developing, 
implementing and enforcing relevant standards, technical regulations and 
conformity assessment procedures.”51 
• Inclusion of a Special Motor Vehicle Safeguard. The original KORUS FTA text 
signed in June 2007, did not include a safeguard specific to the U.S. automotive 
industry, whereas under the 2010 KORUS revisions South Korea committed to 
add a special safeguard for motor vehicles to ensure that the U.S. auto industry is 
not hurt as a result of any “harmful surges” in South Korea auto imports as a 
result of the trade agreement. The new auto-specific safeguard provision would 
allow the United States to impose extra duties if there is an unexpected import 
surge for up to two years. Any higher tariff that might be imposed could be 
applied for four years, instead of three under the general safeguard. The auto 
safeguard would continue for 10 years after the full elimination of tariffs. Thus, 
the safeguard could be in place until at least 2031 in case of truck tariffs. Another 
feature of the safeguard is that it could be applied to a particular auto product 
more than once in the event of a recurring surge that causes serious damage to 
U.S. production of that product. The White House fact sheet also notes that 
“fewer procedural steps are required to speed up the application of the safeguard 
when workers need faster relief.”52 This would seem to make it easier for the 
United States to roll back parts of the agreement if there are complaints. 
Under the 2010 modification, U.S. tariffs on imports of South Korean cars will fall more slowly 
than agreed in 2007 and could be raised in case of an import surge, while South Korean tariffs 
will fall more quickly, albeit not as fast as in the original agreement. The new auto-specific 
provisions would protect the U.S. auto industry for a longer period of time possibly stemming the 
number of South Korean cars coming into the United States.  
Neither the original nor the revised KORUS FTA would affect domestic production of South 
Korean cars. South Korean manufacturers now make hundreds of thousands of cars in the United 
States and they are poised to grow their local production capacity. Thus, a surge in automobile 
imports from South Korea seems unlikely in the next few years. GM Daewoo, the South Korean 
arm of U.S. automaker GM, manufactured over 100,000 cars in South Korea. See Appendix B 
for an overview of South Korea’s motor vehicle manufacturing industry.  
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Expected Impact and Industry Reaction 
The USITC simulation model of the KORUS FTA estimates that while U.S. automotive exports 
to South Korea would increase by a range of 45% to 59%, this would only amount to about $300 
million-$400 million because of the low current baseline.53 It states that tariff elimination “would 
likely have a positive effect on U.S. exports ... further, the overall tax burden on the South Korean 
consumer who purchases an imported vehicle would be reduced, more or less equalizing the total 
taxes paid on imported and domestic vehicles.”54 It particularly emphasizes the potential gain for 
U.S.-exported hybrid vehicles to Korea. Whether this will eventually happen remains uncertain. 
Most hybrids in the U.S. market today are imported from Japan.55 Over 80% of all hybrid electric 
vehicles sold in the United States were made by Japanese automakers in 2009, with the Toyota 
Prius accounting for nearly half of U.S. sales.56 The Detroit-based U.S. manufacturers have 
increased their hybrid electric vehicle sales in recent years, rising from zero in 2003 to 48,200 in 
2009. It is possible, however, that Japanese manufacturers of hybrid electric vehicles could use 
the United States as an export platform to South Korea and other overseas markets. More 
competition could also come from South Korean automakers who are also planning to enter the 
hybrid segment of the U.S. market. Hyundai’s entrant is the Sonata hybrid, which will be the first 
South Korean hybrid sold in the United States.57 
With respect to automotive imports from South Korea into the United States, the USITC 
simulation estimates an “increase by $1.3-1.7 billion (9-12%).” However, it also finds that 
“approximately 55-57% [would be] represented by diverted imports from other trade partners.”58 
Jeffrey Schott of the Peterson Institute for International Economics states that South Korea gave a 
“priority to eliminating the small U.S. tariff” primarily because of Japanese competition. Hyundai 
and Kia seem to be considering the development of pickup trucks that could be sold in the U.S. 
market, although whether they will be produced, and where (in the United States or South Korea), 
in the near future remains unclear.59 Hyundai and Kia do already produce small pickup-type 
vehicles in South Korea, but they would not appear to be suitable in design or style for the United 
States.60  
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U.S. industrial interests’ and labor union views on KORUS FTA may be described as follows: 
• The Detroit Three were split on the 2007 KORUS FTA. Ford and Chrysler were 
opposed to the original agreement, while General Motors (GM) was neutral. Ford 
changed its position based on the amended 2010 agreement stating it “provides 
Ford greater confidence that we will be able to better serve our Korean 
customers.”61 Ford was also concerned about competition from South Korean 
automakers in the U.S. market and the revised agreement would keep U.S. tariffs 
in place for a longer period of time than originally proposed. In particular, the 
truck tariff phase-out would be delayed for eight years before being eliminated in 
year 10 following the implementation of the agreement. 
• Automotive parts suppliers have been supportive of the 2007 agreement because 
of their strong export-based business with Korean customers. 
• Broader-based industry organizations hold favorable views of the 2007 
agreement and have also weighed in positively on the 2009 revised agreement.  
• Labor groups are split. The United Auto Workers (UAW)62 announced they 
would support the agreement, while others like the United Steelworkers (USW)63 
and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM)64 
remain opposed. 
• Until the 2010 changes to the auto provisions were announced, both the 
management side and the labor side of the domestically owned U.S. automotive 
industry used the word “unbalanced” to describe the benefits that could flow 
from the implementation of the KORUS FTA. This may seem odd, given that the 
agreement has many provisions in various chapters dealing with specific South 
Korean policies and practices, and virtually none on the U.S. side, beyond the 
elimination of tariffs. Their views could be colored by the global competitive 
problems currently affecting the unionized, domestically owned sector of the 
U.S. motor vehicle industry which go well beyond the scope of the KORUS FTA 
to solve.65 Indeed, given major differences in the profiles of the U.S. and South 
Korean motor vehicle markets, it remains to be seen whether the Detroit Three 
(GM, Ford, and Chrysler), which tend to specialize domestically in the 
production of larger vehicles, would ever gain more than a fractional position in 
the South Korean market through exports from the United States. Unlike Ford 
and Chrysler, GM has secured a solid investment position in South Korea that it 
is integrating into its global strategy, which helps explain its neutral position. 
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• The original views were reflected in the September 2009 statements submitted to 
the Interagency Trade Policy Staff Committee on the US-Korea Free Trade 
Agreement. In the April 2007 report of the Industry Trade Advisory Committee 
on Automotive and Capital Goods (ITAC 2) to USTR, the chair noted that, 
“Generally, the manufacturers of capital goods see [the FTA] as an important 
milestone in providing market access to a country and region historically 
protectionist.... However, in terms of U.S. automotive equipment manufacturers, 
the outcome is mixed.”66 
Both the U.S. motor vehicle industry representatives and the whole of ITAC 2 initially 
recommended an “unconventional” approach on automotive issues in the negotiations. It would 
have “precondition[ed] the phaseout of U.S. automotive tariffs on the demonstration of South 
Korean market openness in terms of improved import penetration that is on par with that of other 
OECD countries.” 
Some of the earlier opposition to the agreement by some Members of Congress seems to have 
abated. For example, Representative Sander Levin, who has long opposed the auto provisions as 
negotiated in the 2007 agreement, said, “the changes announced in the U.S.-Korea Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA), today are a dramatic step toward changing the one-way street to a two-way 
street for trade between the U.S. and South Korea.”67 Similar views were expressed by the United 
Auto Workers (UAW) union, which until the December 2010 announcement was one of the main 
opponents to the FTA.68 The renegotiated auto provisions were also positively viewed by Ways 
and Means Ranking Members Dave Camp and the Trade Subcommittee Ranking Member Kevin 
Brady. However, some Members remain opposed to the renegotiated agreement, most notably 
Representative Michael Michaud, chairman of the House Trade Working Group, an informal 
working group in the House of Representatives who are pushing for a fair trade agenda, who 
stated,  
I had hoped for more from this White House, which campaigned on the need to change the 
way we negotiate trade agreements so that they truly benefit American workers and 
businesses. The deal reached today, while beneficial to the auto industry, falls far short of 
that goal.69  
In November 2010, the House Trade Working Group wrote to President Obama listing changes 
they viewed as critical before they would endorse the KORUS FTA, including protection of 
worker’s rights, promotion of U.S. manufacturing through reciprocity, and increased export 
opportunities for small and medium manufacturers.70 The AFL-CIO has come out against the 
revised trade agreement with South Korea, citing major concerns over provisions that the union 
believes would encourage the offshoring of U.S. jobs.71  
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The revised agreement did not include earlier demands by some for managed trade. In 2007, 15 
Members of Congress, including Representative Charles Rangel, then chair of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, proposed a “performance metric” approach, which was also suggested by 
ITAC 2. Their proposal would have delayed full elimination of the U.S. import tariff cut for at 
least 15 years, while U.S. representatives assessed South Korea’s performance in opening its 
market for U.S. exports. A formula would be used each year to determine the number of South 
Korean-produced vehicles that would receive duty-free treatment in return. Such an approach 
would have created a one-for-one linkage in which the U.S. tariff would be lowered on one South 
Korean car whenever one U.S. car was sold in South Korea. 
Textiles and Apparel 
Textiles and apparel are a small and dwindling portion of U.S. manufactured imports from South 
Korea. In 2009, textiles accounted for 1.5% of total U.S. imports from South Korea and apparel 
accounted for 1.1%.72 In 2009, the United States imported $0.6 billion in textiles and $0.3 billion 
in apparel from South Korea. South Korea’s shares of the U.S. market for textiles and apparel has 
shrunk in relative and absolute terms over the years. In 1990, for example, South Korea was the 
third-largest source of U.S. imports of apparel with an 13.0% share, but by 2009, it had dropped 
to the 26th-largest source with a 0.4% share. This decrease came largely as the result of the surge 
in China’s share of U.S. apparel imports, which grew from 13.7% in 1990, to 39.1% in 2009. In 
1990, South Korea was the third-largest source of U.S. textile imports of textiles with 9.8% and 
was the seventh-largest in 2009 with a 3.2% share.73 The United States exports small volumes of 
apparel to South Korea—$80 million of apparel in 2009.74 
The KORUS FTA would eliminate U.S. tariffs immediately on 52% (in terms of value) U.S. 
imports of South Korean textiles and apparel, and would phase out U.S. tariffs on 21% over five 
years and on the remaining 27% over 10 years.75 Currently, the average U.S. MFN tariff on 
textiles is 7.9% with a maximum applied tariff of 34.0% and with 16.1% of textiles categories 
already entering the United States duty free. The average applied U.S. MFN tariff on apparel 
imports is 11.5% with a maximum tariff of 32%, and 3.3% of the tariff lines entering duty free.76 
The average South Korean applied tariff on textiles is 9.2% with a maximum of 13% and 0.3% of 
tariff lines entering duty free. The average South Korean tariff on apparel is 12.6% with none 
entering duty free and with a maximum tariff of 13%.77 The KORUS FTA, would eliminate South 
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Korean tariffs immediately on 77% (by value) of U.S. exports of textiles and apparel and would 
phase out tariffs on 13% over three years and the remaining 10% over five years.78 
The KORUS FTA, with some exceptions, would use the yarn-forward rule of origin for apparel 
imports; that is, apparel made from yarn or fabric originating in either the United States or South 
Korea would be eligible for duty-free treatment under the FTA. The FTA also includes a special 
safeguard provision whereby, if imports of textiles or wearing apparel to one KORUS FTA 
partner country from the other increases at such a rate as to cause or threaten to cause serious 
injury to the domestic industry of the importing country, the importing country can suspend 
further reduction of tariffs, or it can increase the duty on the imported product to (the lesser of) 
the MFN rate applicable at the time the action was taken or the MFN duty that was in force when 
the FTA went into effect. The safeguard action can be in place for two years with a possible 
extension of two years but no more than a total of four years. However, the importing country 
will have to compensate the exporting country by making additional trade liberalizing 
concessions equivalent in value to the additional duties expected to result from the safeguard 
action. The concessions would be limited to textiles and apparel unless the two countries agree 
otherwise. 
The USITC has estimated that, if implemented, the KORUS FTA would over time lead to an 
increase in U.S. imports of South Korean textiles of $1.7 billion to $1.8 billion and of apparel of 
$1.0 billion to $1.2 billion, with the major portion of the increase being diverted from other 
countries. The USITC also has estimated that the KORUS FTA would lead to an increase in U.S. 
exports of textiles of $130 million to $140 million and of apparel of $39 million to $45 million to 
South Korea.79 
The KORUS FTA would allow some fibers, yarns, and fabrics originating outside the United 
States and South Korea to become eligible for preferential treatment if the product is not available 
domestically in commercial quantities in either country. The agreement also provides for the 
establishment of a Committee on Textile and Apparel Trade Matters to raise concerns under the 
FTA regarding mutual trade in these products. 
The textile and apparel industry appears split on their views of the KORUS FTA according to the 
Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Textiles and Clothing (ITAC-13).80 Some representatives 
of the textile producers support the yarn-forward rule as benefitting their industry and also 
conforming to provisions in other U.S. FTAs but also argue that it should be broader by including 
sewing thread, narrow fabrics and pocketing fabrics, which are excluded from the rule. Others, 
including some textile representatives and representatives from the apparel industry with supply 
chains in other countries, have criticized the yarn-forward rule as being restrictive and limiting 
trade opportunities. 
Members of the industry are also divided on the lack of cumulation provisions in the FTA, that is 
provisions which allow preferential treatment for limited amounts of apparel woven from 
components outside the FTA area. Textile producers supported the lack of cumulation provisions 
while apparel producers would have wanted them included. They also split on the phase-out 
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periods for tariffs with textile producers arguing that some sensitive products were given 
immediate duty-free treatment. Apparel producers argued that all apparel and textiles should have 
been given immediate duty-free treatment. Footwear and travel goods are also covered under the 
FTA. Producers of both categories strongly support the FTA and how their products would be 
treated.81 
Other Manufactured Goods 
The provisions of the KORUS FTA affect a wide range of other industries beyond the automotive 
sector and textiles and apparel. Cross-sectoral trade associations that represent broad ranges of 
U.S. manufacturers have indicated their support for the agreement, not only because of the 
general elimination of South Korean tariffs on U.S. exports, but also because of such provisions 
as those promising to increase cooperation in the reduction of technical barriers to trade and the 
improvement in South Korea of the protection of U.S. companies’ intellectual property rights.82 
Similarly, most sectoral trade associations expressed support, although some noted reservations 
with specific provisions.83 The steel industry in particular was a notable dissenter. 
Capital Goods Machinery and Equipment 
U.S. machinery exports could be the largest single sectoral gainer from the FTA with South 
Korea. According to the USITC’s simulation analysis, the sector stands to gain nearly $3 billion 
in exports if the agreement is approved.84 The tariffs on U.S. machinery and equipment imported 
into South Korea range from 3% to 13%, but U.S. products are already competitive in many 
cases, and already account for 15%-20% of total South Korean imports. (A specific example is 
U.S.-made computer-numerically controlled machine tools.) Most machinery tariffs would be 
immediately eliminated; others would be phased out over three to 10 years.85 As noted in the 
previous section on autos, the capital goods machinery industry representatives in ITAC 2 split 
with the motor vehicle industry representatives and supported the agreement. The ITAC report 
specifically cited, “U.S. manufacturers of electrical equipment [who] will benefit substantially by 
South Korean tariff reductions and eliminations, where the sector has already returned to running 
a trade surplus with South Korea.”86 The USITC report further noted the export potential of 
electrical-power generating equipment, for which South Korean duties range up to 8% currently. 
U.S. exporters are nonetheless already leading suppliers of turbines, generators and nuclear 
reactors to South Korea.87 The National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEA) stated that 
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U.S. exports to South Korea had risen steadily, by a total of 62%, since 2002, and that there was a 
U.S. surplus in bilateral trade. It calls for: 
legislators in both countries to ratify the Agreement as soon as possible. While the U.S. 
electrical equipment industry still has concerns relating to non-tariff barriers and intellectual 
property protection in South Korea, the overall FTA package would improve conditions for 
selling there by featuring the elimination—most of it immediate—of remaining tariffs on 
goods in NEA’s product scope.88 
Another major capital goods item in which the United States has a strong bilateral trade position 
is aircraft. Total 2008 aircraft and parts exports to South Korea were $2.7 billion. However, 
civilian aircraft imports are already duty-free in South Korea.89 
Electronic Products and Components 
Both South Korean and U.S. tariffs on most electronics products, such as semiconductors, 
telecommunications equipment, and computers, are already zero, as they are included in the 
multilateral Information Technology Agreement eliminating tariffs among more than 50 
countries. As recently as 2006, the United States has a substantial surplus with South Korea in 
semiconductors: $4.7 billion in 2006 exports, versus $2.9 billion in imports. In 2009, the United 
States posted a trade deficit in semiconductors with South Korea of $1.1 billion. The United 
States has a deficit in computer equipment, plus large imports of computer and office equipment 
parts and accessories ($1.5 billion).90 
Sectoral organizations representing these industries supported the KORUS FTA. It was argued the 
FTA would extend tariff-free treatment to consumer electronics products and could guarantee 
improvements for U.S. products in South Korea with respect to intellectual property protection, 
technical barriers, government procurement, and competition policy.91 
Steel 
The American steel industry registered a strongly negative position on the KORUS FTA through 
its industry advisory body to USTR, ITAC 12 (Steel). Its report noted that the agreement “does 
not provide for changes in U.S. AD-CVD statutes” and that each party retains its full rights under 
World Trade Organization rules. However, ITAC 12 objected to “changes to the related legal 
processes” in the KORUS FTA chapter on trade remedies with respect to three “key areas:” 
• By Article 10.7.3, parties are required to notify each other whenever an AD-CVD 
application is filed, and prior to initiation of a formal investigation. They must 
afford the other government an opportunity to consult on the application. The 
steel industry objects to “improperly politicizing the consideration of a trade 
remedy provision filed by a U.S. industry, in a process that is already transparent 
and open,” particularly in antidumping cases. 
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• In Article 10.4, either party must afford to the other an adequate opportunity for, 
and due consideration of, price undertakings by respondent companies, “which, if 
accepted may result in suspension of an investigation” without imposition of 
penalty duties. The steel industry is concerned that the provision “would 
encourage the use of suspension agreements and the injection of foreign 
governments into the trade law process.” 
• The steel industry opposes the provision to establish a bilateral Commission on 
Trade Remedies (Article 10.8) as “unprecedented, unnecessary and would 
provide yet more opportunities for South Korea to weaken U.S. trade law 
enforcement.”92 
The specific details of the trade remedies chapter are discussed elsewhere in this report. Beyond 
these specific issues ITAC 12 also made a number of other critical points. It argued that the rules 
of origin provisions did not follow earlier precedents and there were concerns with products 
eventually being produced in the Kaesong Industrial Complex of North Korea. (See the section 
on the “Kaesong Industrial Complex.”) It objected to the proposed KORUS FTA’s ignoring 
currency manipulation issues. They also supported their U.S. automotive customers’ view that the 
FTA failed to insure adequately access to the South Korean market for U.S.-made motor vehicles. 
On these grounds, “especially with regard to the proposed AD-CVD provisions, ITAC 12 cannot 
conclude at this time that the KORUS FTA promotes the economic interests of the United States 
and provides for equity and reciprocity within the steel sector.”93 
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices 
While pharmaceuticals and medical devices (P&M) are a relatively small part of U.S.-South 
Korean trade, they are products in which U.S. producers compete well in the South Korean 
market and ones in which manufacturers see increasing export opportunities as the South Korean 
economy matures. For years, the U.S. industry and government have complained about a number 
of South Korea’s pharmaceutical policies that allegedly are designed to protect South Korean 
industry, which predominately produces generic drugs. 
South Korea is among the world’s top 12 largest markets for pharmaceuticals, accounting for 
about $8 billion in sales annually.94 The South Korean market for medical devices accounts for 
roughly $2.5 billion in sales annually and is expected to grow 10%-15 % each year in the next 
several years, in part due to the rapid aging of the population.95 While potentially lucrative, South 
Korea is a market in which U.S. P&M manufactures claim government regulations have limited 
their ability to penetrate that market. 
In 2008, the United States exported $410 million in medical devices to South Korea, accounting 
for 2.0% of total U.S. exports of those products and 1.2% of total U.S. exports to South Korea. In 
2008, the United States exported $358 million in pharmaceuticals to South Korea accounting for 
1.0% of total U.S. exports of pharmaceuticals and 1.0% of total U.S. exports to South Korea. In 
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the same year South Korea exported $181.3 million in medical devices and $95.0 million in 
pharmaceuticals to the United States.96 
Of major concern was the South Korean government’s May 2006 change in how it determined 
reimbursement amounts. Prior to the change, it maintained a “negative list” system, under which 
products would be eligible for reimbursement unless they appeared on the list. With the change, 
the South Korean government has switched to a “positive list” requiring a product to be listed 
before it would be eligible making it potentially more difficult for a product to become eligible. 
Announcement of the policy came without prior notification to U.S. officials or affected U.S. 
manufacturers and occurred at an early point in the negotiations placing a cloud over them. 
Despite complaints from the United States, South Korea went ahead with implementing its 
positive list system. 
P&M manufacturers also have cited the South Korean government’s policies on reimbursements 
for pharmaceuticals and medical devices under its single-payer health insurance program. U.S. 
manufacturers have argued that the policies discriminate against innovative pharmaceuticals 
because they establish relatively low reimbursement amounts for medicines thus not taking into 
account the costs that producers of leading-edge pharmaceuticals incur and that are reflected in 
higher prices. The manufacturers wanted the KORUS FTA to establish transparency as an 
important principal in South Korea’s development and implementation of reimbursement policies, 
including an appeal process for decisions going against U.S. manufacturers. 
In response, South Korea agreed in the KORUS FTA to allow U.S. pharmaceutical makers to 
apply for increased reimbursement levels based on safety and efficacy. South Korea also agreed 
to publish proposed laws, regulations, and procedures that apply to the pricing, reimbursement, 
and regulation of pharmaceuticals and medical devices in a nationally available publication and to 
allow time for comment. In addition, South Korea agreed to establish a process for U.S. 
manufacturers to comment on proposed changes in laws and regulations and for them to obtain a 
review of administrative determinations that adversely affect them. 
Intellectual property rights protection in South Korea has been a critical issue for U.S. 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Specifically, the failure of the South Korean government to 
protect from competitors proprietary data that manufacturers must submit for market approval. In 
addition, the South Korean government has, in some cases, approved marketing of some 
pharmaceuticals before it has determined that the applicant is the rightful owner of the patent and 
trademark.97  
In response, under the KORUS FTA’s data exclusivity provisions, South Korea would not allow a 
third company, such as a generic drug manufacturer, from marketing a new pharmaceutical using 
the safety and efficacy data, supplied by an original U.S. manufacturer as part of the market 
approval process, without the permission of the original U.S. maker for five years from the date 
of marketing approval for the original product. In addition, if a third party submits safety or 
efficacy information for a product that an FTA partner government had already approved, the 
government is to notify the original patent holder of the identity of the third party and is to 
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prevent the marketing of the third party’s product on its territory if permission had not been 
granted by the original patent holder. In a side letter, the United States and South Korea agreed to 
not invoke the data exclusivity provision until the FTA has been in effect 18 months. 
Furthermore, South Korea agreed to a patent-linkage system; that is, neither government is to 
approve the marketing of a generic drug while the original patent is still in effect. Another 
provision, known as patent-term extension, would require each FTA government to adjust the 
length of the effective period for patents on pharmaceuticals to take into account delays incurred 
in receiving patent approval and marketing approval. The KORUS FTA states that no provision 
would prevent either government from taking measures to protect the public health of its residents 
from HIV/AID, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics, by ensuring access to medicines. The 
FTA would reaffirm each country’s commitment to the WTO TRIPS/health Declaration. 
Reactions within the pharmaceutical and medical devices industries were somewhat split on the 
KORUS FTA. Makers of innovative products supported the provisions that are designed to 
preserve the rights of patent holders and provisions that are designed to make the South Korean 
regulatory, pricing, and reimbursement process more transparent and open to comments and 
procedural reviews. At the same time, industry representatives remain critical of South Korea’s 
new reimbursement procedures and argue that the new system does not take into account the 
benefits of innovative drugs that cause drug prices to be higher. Generic drug manufacturers 
argue that the KORUS FTA does not contain provisions guaranteeing the availability of 
affordable drugs.98 
Financial and Other Services 
South Korea was the seventh-largest U.S. market for cross-border trade in services in 2008. U.S. 
service providers exported $15.4 billion in services to South Korea. Among them were South 
Koreans’ travel to the United States ($2.6 billion); other transportation, such as freight services 
($3.5 billion); royalties and license fees ($3.2 billion); and other private services, such as 
professional services, business services, banking, insurance, and other financial services ($4.9 
billion).99 However, this amount probably undervalues the total volume of U.S. sales of services 
to South Korea as services are also sold through three other modes of delivery: by U.S. 
companies with a long-term presence in South Korea, by U.S. providers to South Korean 
residents located temporarily in the United States; and by U.S. providers temporarily located in 
South Korea. 
In 2008, the United States imported $9.6 billion in services, including other transportation ($3.3 
billion), U.S. travel to South Korea ($1.2 billion), expenditures by U.S. military ($2.4 billion), 
and other travel ($1.7 billion).100 This figure does not include services sold to U.S. residents by 
South Korean firms through the other modes of delivery. 
U.S.-South Korean trade in services cuts across several chapters of the KORUS FTA—Chapter 
12 (cross-border trade in services); chapter 13 (financial services); and Chapter 15 
(telecommunications); chapter 11 (foreign investment); among others. A major U.S. objective in 
                                                             
98
 Report of the United States Industry Trade Advisory Committee for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Health/Science 
Products, and Service (ITAC-3) on The United States-South Korea Trade Promotion Agreement. April 24, 2007. 
99
 Data obtained from U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
100
 Ibid. 
The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) 
 
Congressional Research Service 31 
the KORUS FTA negotiations was to obtain South Korean commitments to reduce barriers to 
trade and investment in its services sector, especially in professional, financial, and 
telecommunications services. 
In general the two countries would commit to: 
• provide national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment to the services 
imports from each other; 
• promote transparency in the development and implementation of regulations in 
services providing timely notice of decisions on government permission to sell 
services; 
• prohibit limits on market access, such as a caps on the number of service 
providers, on the total value of services provided, on the total quantity of services 
provided, and on the total number of persons that can be employed by services 
providers; 
• prohibit foreign direct investment requirements, such as export and local content 
requirements and employment mandates; and 
• prohibit restrictions on the type of business entity through which a service 
provider could provide a service. 
U.S. and South Korean negotiators agreed to several concepts under the KORUS FTA that could 
apply the agreements’ provisions to a broad scope of services. The two countries agreed to the 
“negative list” approach in making commitments in services. That is, the KORUS FTA is to apply 
to all types of services unless identified as an exception in the relevant annexes. In addition, the 
commitments are ratcheted—when new services emerge in the U.S. or South Korean economies, 
those services are automatically covered by the FTA unless identified as an exception; if either 
country unilaterally liberalizes a measure that it had listed as an exemption, it is automatically 
covered under the FTA. Furthermore, if one KORUS FTA partner extends preferential treatment 
to service providers from a third country under another FTA, it is to extend the preferential 
treatment to its KORUS FTA partner. 
The United States sought greater reciprocity in the treatment of professional services and thereby 
gain increased access to the South Korean market for U.S. providers. The United States and South 
Korea agreed to form a professional services working group to develop methods to recognize 
mutual standards and criteria for the licensing of professional service providers. Under the 
KORUS FTA, South Korea would allow U.S. law firms to establish representative offices in 
South Korea no later than two years after the KORUS FTA entered into force. South Korea would 
also permit U.S. legal representative offices to establish cooperative operations with a South 
Korean firm to handle matters pertaining to domestic and foreign legal matters, and, no later than 
five years after the agreement’s entry into force, would allow U.S. law firms to establish joint 
ventures with South Korean firms. However, South Korea would still reserve the right to restrict 
the activities of foreign lawyers. 
Regarding financial services, under the KORUS FTA, if a domestic provider in one partner 
country develops and sells a new financial service in its home market, providers from the FTA 
partner country would be able to sell a like service in that market. The agreement would allow an 
FTA partner government to impose restrictions on the sale of financial services by providers from 
the other partner country for prudential reasons, for example, to protect investors, depositors, 
policy holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed. The FTA would also permit either 
The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) 
 
Congressional Research Service 32 
partner government to restrict monetary transfers in order to ensure the soundness of financial 
institutions. 
The South Korean insurance market is the seventh-largest in the world. The USITC estimates, 
therefore, that U.S. insurers would be poised to obtain sizeable gains in a liberalized South 
Korean services market.101 U.S. insurance companies have been concerned that the state-owned 
Korea Post and the cooperative insurance providers—the National Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation and the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative—are not regulated by the 
Korean Financial Supervisory Commission or by the Financial Supervisory Service, while both 
private-sector foreign and domestic providers are so regulated.102 Under the KORUS FTA, South 
Korea agreed that those entities would be subject to an independent state regulator as opposed to 
being self-regulated.103 In addition, Korea Post would not be allowed to offer new insurance 
products. The two countries would allow a partner country financial services provider to transfer 
electronically information from its territory as necessary in the course of doing business.104 This 
is a provision that the U.S. industry highlighted as being particularly important. 
In telecommunications services, South Korea would reduce government restrictions on foreign 
ownership of South Korean telecommunications companies. Two years after the KORUS FTA 
enters into force, U.S. companies would be able to own up to 100% of voting shares in domestic 
South Korean telecommunications companies, and those companies would be able to own up to 
100% of a facilities-based licensee.105 These provisions do not apply to KT Corporation nor to SL 
Telecom Co for which a 49% foreign ownership limit would remain. In addition, each KORUS 
FTA partner would ensure that telecommunications providers from the other would have access to 
and use of its public telecommunications network for purposes of interconnection under non-
discriminatory conditions and would guarantee dialing portability among other conditions.106 
Those who represent U.S. services providers have been enthusiastic about the KORUS FTA and 
have urged its approval. In a statement, Robert Vastine, president of the Coalition of Services 
Industries claimed: 
We commend Ambassador Schwab and the team of negotiators who secured significant 
benefits for U.S. services providers in this agreement.... Korea is a key market for U.S. 
service companies, and this is a very high-quality agreement that merits swift passage by the 
Congress because it creates new commercial opportunities that will support new jobs.107 
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Visas 
For years, a priority for South Korea has been to convince the United States to ease restrictions on 
the issuance of visas for South Korean business representatives. The visa issue—along with South 
Korea’s request to be added to the Visa Waiver program (VWP), which allows visa free travel for 
short-term visitors—was addressed in discussions outside of the KORUS FTA negotiations. On 
October 17, 2008, President Bush announced that South Korea was one of seven countries that 
would be admitted into the program in 4-6 weeks.108 With this step, the VWP is likely to no 
longer be an issue in bilateral relations. South Korea is one of the United States’ largest sources of 
foreign visitors. In FY2007 there were 811,251 short-term visitors for business or pleasure from 
South Korea.109 
On a separate track, as part of the package of modifications agreed to on December 3, 2010, the 
United States agreed to extend the initial validity period of L-1A visas. These visas are used by 
foreigners entering the United States to work at U.S.-subsidiary of a foreign company. One group 
of these visas are used for foreigners coming to establish a U.S. subsidiary and the initial validity 
period was extended from one to five years. A second group is used for foreigners coming to 
work at an already established subsidiary and the initial validity period was extended from three 
to five years.110 
General Provisions 
The KORUS FTA text contains a number of provisions that cut across in many sectors in bilateral 
trade. Many of these provisions have become standard fare and have become part of the template 
for FTAs in which the United States participates. 
Trade Remedies111 
Trade remedies, laws, and actions designed to provide relief to domestic industries that have been 
injured or threatened with injury by imports, are regarded by many in Congress as an important 
trade policy tool to mitigate the adverse effects of lower priced imports on U.S. industries and 
workers. 
The three most commonly used trade remedies are antidumping (AD), countervailing duty 
(CVD), and safeguard actions. Antidumping (19 U.S.C. § 1673 et seq.) actions provide relief 
from the adverse impact of imports sold at prices shown to be less than fair market value, and 
countervailing duty (19 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq.) actions provide similar relief from goods that have 
been subsidized by a foreign government or other public entity. Safeguard actions (19 U.S.C. § 
2251 et seq.) are designed to give domestic industries an opportunity to adjust to new competition 
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and are triggered by import surges of fairly traded goods. The relief provided in a safeguard case 
is a temporary import duty, temporary import quota, or a combination of both, while the relief in 
an antidumping or countervailing duty action is an additional duty placed on the dumped or 
subsidized imports. These actions are authorized by the WTO as long as they are consistent with 
the rights and obligations of Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
1994, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies Agreement), 
and the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Antidumping 
Agreement).112 
Many Members of Congress have expressed support for maintaining and strengthening U.S. trade 
remedy laws in the face of growing import competition. As a result, the preservation of U.S. 
authority to “enforce rigorously its trade laws” was a principal negotiating objective included in 
presidential Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in the 107th Congress.113 
According to news reports, the “single most important South Korean demand” in the bilateral 
talks was changes to U.S. antidumping rules.114 This may be due, in part, to the significant 
number of U.S. trade remedy cases brought by U.S. industries on South Korean goods. As of 
February 12, 2010, antidumping duties were being collected on 12 South Korean imports (mostly 
on stainless steel specialty products such wire rod and pipe fittings), and countervailing duties 
were being assessed on 3 South Korean products, while South Korea had no trade remedy 
measures in place against U.S. products.115 The U.S. global safeguard cases imposed on steel in 
February 2000 (line pipe) and March 2002 (many steel products) also significantly reduced South 
Korean steel imports to the United States.116 Of the 14 WTO dispute resolution complainant cases 
South Korea has brought to date, eight have been disputes against U.S. trade remedy actions.117 
South Korea is also a member “Friends of Antidumping” group in the WTO Doha Round that 
insists on implementing changes to the Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements in any new 
multilateral agreement. 
In the bilateral negotiations between the United States and South Korea, talks broke down in early 
December 2006 when South Korea presented the United States with a list of specific changes to 
U.S. antidumping laws on a “basically” take-it-or-leave-it basis,118 but in mid-January 2007, 
South Korean officials softened their stance after accepting the assurances of U.S. negotiators that 
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Trade Promotion Authority had granted the Bush Administration only limited flexibility to make 
concessions on trade remedy issues.119 
The KORUS FTA, just as in earlier FTAs the United States has entered into, proposes that each 
party to the agreement would retain all rights and obligations under the WTO agreements—
meaning that the trading partners would be permitted to include each other in global safeguard 
actions (although, as in other FTAs, it does extend a possible exemption from global safeguard 
measures to either party if its imports are not a substantial cause of serious injury) and to 
implement AD and CVD actions against each other. Additionally, as in earlier FTAs, the trade 
remedies article would also authorize either party to the agreement to apply a transitional 
safeguard measure against imports of the other party if, as the result of the reduction or 
elimination of a duty mandated by the agreement, a product is being imported in increased 
quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to a domestic industry that produces a like 
or directly competitive good.120 
In the case of a safeguard, the party imposing it must provide a mutually agreed-upon amount of 
compensation. If the parties do not agree, the other party may suspend concessions on imports of 
the other party in an amount that has trade effects substantially equivalent to the safeguard 
measure.121 
As such, the agreement does not seem to require any changes to U.S. AD, CVD, or global 
safeguard laws, or substantially change administrative procedures required to implement these 
actions.122 However, in an apparent departure from previous FTAs, the KORUS FTA seems to 
require a few additional administrative steps prior to initiation of a trade remedy investigation 
involving goods from the other party. First, each party would have to notify the other if an 
antidumping petition is received regarding the other party’s imports, as well as provide an 
opportunity for a meeting between the parties before an investigation is initiated.123 Additionally, 
the party initiating an AD or CVD investigation would be required to provide written information 
regarding its procedures for negotiating a price or quantity undertaking (known in U.S. law as a 
suspension agreement),124 and, after a preliminary affirmative determination is reached, “provide 
due consideration and adequate opportunity for consultations regarding proposed price 
undertakings” which could result in suspension of the investigation without imposition of duties 
provided a mutually agreeable undertaking is reached.125 
The KORUS FTA would also establish a Committee on Trade Remedies (which would meet at 
least once a year) made up of representatives from each party who have responsibility for trade 
remedies matters. Committee functions would include enhancing knowledge of the parties’ trade 
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remedy laws and practices, overseeing the implementation of the trade remedies chapter of the 
agreement, improving cooperation between the parties, developing educational programs on trade 
remedy laws, and providing a forum for exchange of information on trade remedies and other 
topics of mutual interest.126 
As discussed earlier, the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Steel (ITAC 12) believes that the 
procedural concessions made on trade remedies could politicize trade remedy actions, thus 
possibly weakening U.S. trade laws. In particular, the ITAC 12 stated that the U.S. AD-CVD 
investigative process is already transparent and that the pre-initiation notification and consultation 
requirements would delay and politicize the process.127 It also objected to the “undertakings” 
provisions, saying that these provisions would encourage the use of suspension agreements and 
introduce actions of foreign governments into trade remedy procedures.128 (For more information 
on the steel industry’s reaction, see discussion in section on “Other Manufactured Goods.”) 
The ITAC 12 also opposes the establishment of a Committee on Trade Remedies, saying that it 
such a forum would give South Korea an opportunity to attempt to further try to weaken U.S. 
trade remedy laws.129 Speaking in April 2007, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Korea, 
Japan, and APEC Wendy Cutler, the chief U.S. negotiator, implied that the consultative 
committee would focus on information sharing and “will not provide a forum to discuss specific 
cases.”130 She also mentioned that the committee could be a benefit to the United States by 
providing a platform for discussing certain industrial subsidies that the South Korean government 
may be supplying to manufacturing firms, and that negotiators worked out an “accommodation” 
that was beneficial to both sides’ needs on a very contentious part of the negotiations.131 
Kaesong Industrial Complex132 
A consistent and significant goal for South Korea in the FTA talks was securing preferential 
treatment for products made in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) in North Korea, a position 
the United States adamantly opposed throughout most of the negotiations. Located near the North 
Korean city of Kaesong (also spelled “Gaesong”), 40 miles north of Seoul, the KIC is designed 
for South Korean companies to employ North Korean workers. The factories of 15 South Korean 
manufacturing firms began operating when the site opened in 2004. As of November 2007, this 
number had increased to 52 firms, which employed about 20,000 North Korean workers. There 
are plans to expand the zone dramatically. The South Korean Unification Ministry expects that by 
the end of 2010, about 450 South Korean manufacturers and 100,000 North Korean workers will 
be in the KIC.133 The KIC arguably has become the centerpiece for South Korea’s “sunshine 
policy” of engaging North Korea. 
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In the final KORUS FTA agreement, the two sides reached a compromise on the KIC. One year 
after the KORUS FTA enters into force, a binational committee will be formed to study the 
possibility of eventually including products from “Outward Processing Zones” (OPZs) using 
North Korean labor sometime in the future.134 The agreement identifies three general categories 
for which the committee is to develop more detailed criteria: progress in the denuclearization of 
North Korea, developments in intra-Korean relations; and wages, the environment, and labor 
standards. For the third category of issues, the committee is to consider relevant international 
norms as well as the “situation prevailing elsewhere on the Peninsula.” After the committee has 
developed criteria, the OPZ provisions in the FTA lay out a three step process by which products 
made in the KIC could be incorporated into the FTA. First, the committee must deem that an 
outward processing zone meets the criteria it has established. Second, the two governments must 
agree that the FTA should be amended accordingly. Third, each government must seek 
“legislative approval for any amendments to the Agreement with respect to outward processing 
zones.” The agreement does not lay out the size or composition of the committee, or how 
committee members will be chosen, or the procedures by which the committee is to arrive at 
decisions.135 
In the KORUS FTA negotiations, the United States backed away from the principle of its initial 
position of not ever expanding the KORUS FTA to North Korea-made products, a significant 
achievement for South Korea. At the same time, the United States appeared to give up little in 
substance in the near-to-middle term. The United States apparently would be able to control the 
decision to and pace of any move to grant preferential treatment to North Korea-made products. 
Any perceptions of foot-dragging by the United States, however, may come at a diplomatic price 
if future South Korean governments push for more rapid integration of North Korean industrial 
zones into the FTA. 
Two important issues for the United States in considering South Korea’s demand were the 
conditions for North Korean workers and the income the KIC provides for the North Korean 
government. Some U.S. labor and human rights advocates have argued that North Korean 
workers in Kaesong are being exploited. South Korean officials, as well as other analysts, counter 
by saying that conditions at Kaesong are far better than those in the rest of North Korea. 
Additionally, the North Korean government derives hard currency from several sources in the 
KIC project, including leasing fees and surcharges levied on North Korean workers’ wages, 
which are paid to an arm of the North Korean government agency before being passed on to 
employees (in the form of North Korean won). To date, these revenue streams are likely to be 
relatively small, though not insignificant, given the small size of the North Korean economy and 
its shortage of hard currency. If the most ambitious goals for the Kaesong project are realized, by 
the middle of the next decade the North Korean government would likely derive tens if not 
hundreds of millions of dollars annually from tax revenues and its slice of North Korean workers’ 
wages, assuming the KIC’s current tax and wage structures remain in place.136 Some South 
Koreans caution that the uncertainties over the future course of the KIC project make such 
projections highly speculative. 
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Foreign Investment 
Foreign investment is becoming an increasingly significant element in the U.S.-South Korean 
bilateral economic relationship. Over the past decade, the stock of U.S.-South Korean foreign 
direct investment (FDI), valued on an historical cost basis, has increased substantially, due in no 
small part to the market-oriented reforms South Korea undertook after its 1997 financial crisis. In 
1997, the value of stock of U.S. FDI in South Korea was $6.5 billion and had increased to $27.7 
billion by the end of 2008. In 2008, 33% of U.S. FDI in South Korea was in manufacturing, 
especially in computers and electronic products, chemicals, and other manufacturing facilities. 
The remainder of the FDI was in services, with U.S. FDI in banking and other financial services 
accounting for much of this investment. South Korean FDI in the United States has also increased 
substantially in the last 11 years, albeit from a much lower base. In 1997, the stock of South 
Korean FDI in the United States was valued at $0.6 billion and had increased to $15.6 billion by 
the end of 2008.137 
Foreign investment has been a sensitive issue in U.S.-South Korean relations for many years as 
U.S. investors have tried to make inroads into the South Korean economy. U.S. investors’ 
criticisms have included restrictions on foreign investment in key sectors, such as 
communications, and the lack of adequate protection for intellectual property. (See section on 
“Intellectual Property Rights.”) Efforts to establish bilateral rules have failed in the past. In the 
1990s, the two countries tried to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), that would commit 
each party to provide national treatment to the investments from the other party and abstain from 
performance requirements for foreign investments from the other party. But the negotiations 
collapsed largely over U.S. opposition to South Korea’s so-called screen quota on domestic films 
and the latter’s resistance to lifting or reducing it. (The South Korean government reduced the 
screen quotas by half just before the KORUS FTA negotiations were launched in February 2006.) 
The KORUS FTA chapter on investment essentially contains the commitments that would 
otherwise have been in a BIT. 
The FTA sets down general principals for the treatment by South Korea and the United States of 
investors and investments from one partner in the territory of the other.138 The principle of 
national treatment—that one party to the agreement will treat covered investments and investors 
from the other party no-less favorably than it treats domestic investors and investments—is 
paramount. The FTA allows each party to make exceptions to the national treatment principle, but 
those exceptions must be specified in the relevant annexes to the agreement.139 A second 
fundamental principal is most-favored-nation treatment (MFN)—the two parties agree to treat 
investors and investments from the other no less favorably than it treats investors and investments 
from third, non-party countries. A third principle is minimum standard of treatment, that is, each 
party shall accord to all covered investments treatment in accordance with customary 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 
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The KORUS FTA would set limits on government expropriation of covered investments—that 
they be only for public purpose and carried out in a non-discriminatory manner, and affected 
investors would be provided with prompt and adequate compensation (fair market value). It also 
would require each KORUS FTA partner-country government allow for the free transfer of 
financial capital pertaining to covered investments both into and out of the country with 
exceptions, such as cases related to criminal offenses. The KORUS FTA would prohibit the U.S. 
and South Korean governments from imposing performance requirements (domestic content 
requirements, export-ratios, import limits, etc.) on the investments from the other. It would allow 
exceptions for measures intended to accomplish social objectives, such as to increase 
employment in certain regions of the country, promote training of workforce, and protect the 
environment. The agreement would also prohibit a requirement that senior managers be of a 
particular nationality but would allow a requirement that the majority of board of directors be of a 
particular nationality. 
Similar to other U.S. FTAs, the KORUS FTA would establish procedures for the settlement of 
investor-state disputes involving investments covered under the agreement where the investor 
from one partner-country alleges that the government of the other partner-country is violating his 
rights under the FTA. The FTA stipulates that the two parties should try to first resolve the dispute 
through consultations and negotiations. But, if that does not work, the agreement would provide 
for arbitration procedures and the establishment of tribunals as provided under the “Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States.” 
The USITC concluded that U.S. investors, especially investors in financial services, would likely 
gain from the KORUS FTA.140 (See section on “Financial and Other Services.”) The United 
States has been the predominate partner in terms of foreign investment and stands to gain the 
most from the protections provided by the KORUS FTA. However, South Korean investments in 
the United States are increasing, and therefore, South Korea could benefit as well. 
Intellectual Property Rights 
In addition to those sections addressing pharmaceutical manufacturing (see discussion above), the 
KORUS FTA contains other provisions on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in U.S.-
South Korean trade. Under the FTA the United States and South Korea would reaffirm their 
commitments under the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreement and other international agreements and conventions on intellectual property. But the 
two countries would make IPR commitments beyond those agreements with provisions that 
would: 
• require each government to extend national treatment to IPR holders from the 
other country;141 
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• require transparency through the publication of regulations and laws regarding 
intellectual property rights; 
• facilitate the registration of and protection of trademarks and established 
limitations on the use of geographical indications; 
• ensure the right of authors, performers, producers of recordings to determine use 
of copyrighted products; 
• require copyright protection for no less than 70 years; thus, South Korea agrees 
to extend its copyright protection term, an objective of U.S. copyright holders; 
• protect copyrighted material against piracy and provide penalties for those who 
abet piracy including the seizure and destruction of pirated and counterfeit 
products; 
• protect copyrighted performances on the internet; and 
• protect encrypted programming over satellites and cable signals. 
Labor Rights and Conditions 
On May 10, 2007, a bipartisan group of congressional leaders and the Bush Administration 
released a statement that provided language to be included in pending and future FTAs, including 
KORUS FTA. Among other things, the statement, or framework, called “The New Trade Policy 
for America,” requires U.S. FTA partners to commit to enforcing the five basic international labor 
standards and would require that the commitment be enforceable under the FTA.142 Neither 
country is to waive or otherwise derogate from its labor statutes that reflect the five labor rights in 
a manner that affects trade or investment between the two FTA countries. Each country is to 
ensure that those affected by their respective labor laws have access to tribunals that enforce their 
rights under those laws. During his nomination process, USTR Ron Kirk stated the Obama 
Administration’s position that the KORUS FTA appropriately incorporates the May 10th 
agreement.143  
Under the KORUS FTA the two countries are to form a Labor Council made up of officials 
responsible for labor matters in each country, that will meet within the first year after the 
agreement enters into force. At least one session of the council will be devoted to meeting with 
the public in each country to discuss matters related to the enforcement of the labor provisions of 
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the FTA. Disputes regarding labor matters under the FTA are to be resolved first by consultations, 
but if those fail, the parties in dispute may take the matter to the Labor Council and eventually to 
a dispute settlement panel if these mechanisms fail to resolve the dispute. The KORUS FTA also 
calls for the establishment of a Labor Cooperation Mechanism whereby the two countries would 
develop and work in areas pertaining to labor rights in each country. 
To many outside observers, South Korea’s labor rights regime is generally considered to be strong 
for regular workers. South Korea ranks in the top third of the OECD’s thirty members in terms of 
employment protection for regular workers.144 Indeed, for years, a major complaint of U.S. 
multinationals is that restrictions in the South Korean labor market, such as mandatory severance 
pay, significantly raise the cost of investing and doing business in Korea. In contrast, U.S. union 
representatives argue that recent changes to make South Korean labor markets more flexible are 
reducing the rights of South Korean workers.145 Korea’s unions have earned a reputation for 
activism; the number of working days lost to strikes is regularly among the highest in the OECD. 
Hyundai Motors, for instance, has experienced a strike every year since 1994. Moreover, strikes 
in South Korea are notable in that they are sometimes accompanied by violence and the 
occupation of workplaces and public spaces (such as highways), to which the government often 
responds with police action. In its comments on the KORUS FTA, the Labor Advisory Committee 
for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy (LAC), criticized South Korea for the imprisonment of 
around 200 unionists who were “exercising basic labor rights” and for mobilizing riot police 
against union activity.146 
Korea’s labor pool is divided into two segments: (1) South Korean “salarymen” (salaried workers, 
overwhelmingly men, in large corporations) comprise less than one-third of the workforce. Over 
half of this segment of the workforce is represented by powerful unions. (2) The remainder of the 
workforce is comprised of employees in small-scale firms plus the country’s temporary and day 
laborers. Few of these workers are unionized. The proportion of temporary workers has grown 
markedly, to nearly one-third of the workforce, one of the highest rates in the industrialized 
world.147 These workers tend to receive low wages and receive limited coverage by the social 
safety net, points highlighted by the LAC. Labor markets are notoriously rigid. 
Government Procurement 
A great deal of business is conducted by governments through the purchase of goods and services 
for their own use. Most governments, including the United States have laws (The Buy American 
Act) which require such goods and services to be of domestic origin. However, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and now the WTO have some provisions, the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), under which the countries agree to open up some of 
their government procurement business, to foreign companies as a way to promote trade. This 
agreement is plurilateral, that is it only applies to those WTO members that have signed it. The 
United States and South Korea are among the 39 signatories to the GPA. The GPA established 
rules for governments to publish information about contract tenders, including technical 
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specification, about qualification for suppliers, the awarding of contracts, with a specific 
emphasis on nondiscrimination and transparency in the conduct of government procurement. 
The KORUS FTA reaffirms the GPA as a baseline for government procurement but would expand 
the criteria to include more contracts. The GPA applies to contracts valued at around $193,000 
and above. The KORUS FTA would apply agreement to contracts valued at $100,000 and above, 
potentially increasing the value of bilateral government-procurement trade. The GPA applies only 
to contracts tendered by 79 U.S. federal government agencies and by 42 South Korean central and 
subcentral agencies listed in the annex. Under the KORUS FTA, South Korea would add nine 
more agencies to be covered. 
Environment Protection 
In keeping with the May 10, 2007 agreement on labor and the environment between the Bush 
Administration and congressional leaders, under the KORUS FTA, the United States and South 
Korea would commit to enforce a list of seven multilateral environmental agreements to which 
both are parties and to add to the list when other agreements enter into force. (See the “Labor 
Rights and Conditions” section above.)148 In addition, the FTA would prevent the two countries 
from easing environmental standards in order to allow firms on their territory from gaining a 
competitive trade advantage. Furthermore, violations of the environmental provisions are to be 
handled in the same manner as commercial provisions through the dispute settlement mechanism 
of the KORUS FTA and subject to trade sanctions, unprecedented for U.S. FTAs. As mentioned 
earlier, the Obama Administration has indicated that the May 2007 agreement is incorporated into 
the KORUS FTA.149 
Transparency 
Making information publically available is a fundamental principle imbedded in international 
trade rules and in each of the FTAs that the United States has entered into. For years U.S. 
exporters and trade negotiators identified the lack of transparency of South Korea’s trading and 
regulatory systems as one of the most significant barriers to trade with South Korea, in almost 
every major product sector. Under KORUS FTA, the United States and South Korea would 
commit to publish relevant regulations and administrative decisions as well as proposed 
regulations; to allow persons from the other party to make comments and to ask questions 
regarding proposed regulations; to notify such persons of administrative proceedings and to allow 
them make presentations before final administrative action is taken; and to allow such persons to 
request review and appeal of administrative decisions. 
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Institutional Provisions and Dispute Settlement 
The KORUS FTA would provide several options for the United States and South Korea to resolve 
disputes arising under the agreement, in addition to the special dispute settlement provisions 
under the foreign investment chapter and other chapters. KORUS FTA would require the two 
countries to establish a joint committee chaired by the USTR and the Minister of Foreign Trade or 
their designees to supervise the implementation of the agreement. The committee would establish 
a panel to adjudicate disputes between the two countries under the agreement, if consultations do 
not lead to a resolution of the dispute. Annex 22A of the KORUS FTA contains provisions for the 
settlement of disputes regarding motor vehicles, specifically the snap-back provision. (See 
discussion in section on “Autos.”) Annex 22-B provides for eventual discussion of the inclusion 
of products made in outward processing zones in North Korea. (For more information, see 
discussion in “Kaesong Industrial Complex” section.) 
Other Technical Provisions 
The KORUS FTA includes other sets of provisions intended to facilitate market access. Technical 
barriers to trade are standards and regulations that are intended ostensibly to protect the health 
and safety of consumers and for other legitimate non-trade purposes but may through design and 
implementation discriminate against imports. The KORUS FTA would commit both countries to 
uphold their obligations under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). In 
addition, South Korea and the United States would promote transparency, by allowing persons 
from the other party to participate in the development of standards, technical regulations, and 
conformity assessment procedures. 
Regarding customs administration and trade facilitation, the KORUS FTA would promote joint 
cooperation to ensure compliance with each other’s customs laws and regulations. For example, it 
would require the two countries to adopt procedures and regulations to facilitate express delivery 
shipments. 
Rules of origin define what are goods that originate in the FTA region and therefore are eligible 
for preferential treatment. (Textiles and apparel have separate rules of origin.) The KORUS FTA 
would require that goods must be wholly obtained or produced in the territory of both countries or 
country. The FTA would set a regional value threshold to be met to be considered originating in 
the FTA territory and provides formulas for determining the regional values. 
National competition laws and regulations are intended to ensure that one firm does not so 
dominate a sector of the economy as to inhibit market entry and stifle competition. Among other 
things, the KORUS FTA would require that the United States and South Korea inform persons, 
who are subject to administrative actions, of hearings and provide them the opportunity to make 
their case. The two countries would cooperate in enforcing competition laws through the 
exchange of information and consultation. In addition, designated monopolies and state-
enterprises would have to operate in conformance with the agreement and in accordance with 
commercial considerations. 
The KORUS FTA includes provisions to facilitate trade via electronic commerce (e-commerce). 
They would prohibit discrimination against digital products and imposing customs duties on these 
products. They would also require the recognition of electronic authentication and electronic 
signatures and would promote consumer access to the Internet. 
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Next Steps, Implications, and the Emerging Debate 
The United States concluded and entered into (signed) the KORUS FTA within the parameters of 
the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002. (P.L. 
107-210). Therefore, any implementing legislation would be subjected to expedited procedures, 
that is mandatory congressional consideration, limited debate, no amendments, and an up-or-
down vote. TPA does not impose a deadline on the President to submit the draft implementing 
bill. It is generally assumed that the President would do so only when he expects to have 
sufficient support in Congress to pass it, although he could submit the bill without that assurance 
and risk the bill’s failure. President Bush did not send implementing legislation for the KORUS 
FTA to the 110th Congress before his term ended largely because of differences between his 
Administration and the Democratic leadership of the 110th Congress over the potential 
effectiveness of the agreement in addressing South Korean barriers to U.S. exports of 
manufactured goods, particularly autos, and South Korea’s remaining restrictions on imports of 
U.S. beef.  
During the first two years of his Administration, President Obama expressed support for the 
KORUS FTA but indicated that the outstanding issues regarding autos and beef needed to be 
resolved before he could send the agreement and implementing legislation to Congress for 
approval. With the announcement of the modifications to the agreement on December 3, 2010, it 
appears clear the Obama Administration intends to move ahead with the approval process 
sometime in the first half of 2011, despite the remaining outstanding beef issue.  
Implications for South Korea and the U.S.-ROK Alliance 
In South Korea, the KORUS FTA must be approved by a majority vote in the unicameral 
National Assembly to take effect. The Assembly is controlled by President Lee Myung Bak’s 
Grand National Party, which officially supports the agreement. Unlike in the United States, trade 
agreements are not subject to any fast-track time lines. President Lee Myung Bak, who was 
elected in December 2007, has made passage of the KORUS FTA a priority for his government. 
Most opinion polls generally have shown a majority of South Koreans in favor of the agreement, 
though opposition has been intense from the opposition parties and rural interests, among others. 
Furthermore, most polls of South Korean legislators show broad support for the agreement within 
the National Assembly. The KORUS FTA was not a significant issue in either the 2007 
presidential election campaign, despite the fact that one of the major candidates opposed the 
agreement in the April 2008 parliamentary elections. 
For South Korea, entering an FTA with the United States meshes with a number of Lee’s 
economic and strategic goals. Ongoing competitive pressure from Japanese firms, increased 
competition from Chinese enterprises, and the rapid aging of the South Korean workforce has 
heightened the sense of urgency to boost national long-term competitiveness, particularly in the 
services industries, where South Korean productivity typically lags compared to other 
industrialized countries. Indeed, former President Roh and other South Korean officials have 
argued that the KORUS FTA is essential for South Korea’s economic survival.150 Similarly, if less 
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grandiosely, President Lee has argued that passage of the KORUS FTA will help revitalize South 
Korea’s economy. To accelerate Korea’s reform efforts—and also to avoid being left out from 
other FTAs being created globally and in Asia—Presidents Roh and Lee have pursued an 
aggressive effort to negotiate FTAs. South Korea has entered into FTAs with Chile, Singapore, 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), and India. It has signed an agreement with the European Union and is negotiating 
FTAs with other countries, including Canada, Mexico, and Australia.151  
The United States and South Korea negotiated the KORUS FTA in part as a means to restore the 
health of a critical foreign policy and national security alliance.152 While the talks were ongoing, 
the KORUS FTA sometimes was discussed as a possible counterweight to the bilateral friction 
that was occurring over issues such as how to manage relations with North Korea and the re-
positioning of U.S. troops in South Korea. These tensions decreased markedly in 2007, following 
the Bush Administration’s decision to place greater emphasis on engagement and negotiations 
with North Korea. The election of Lee, who has stressed the importance of rebuilding U.S.-South 
Korean ties has improved relations further. Thus, with the alliance apparently on firmer ground, 
the KORUS FTA no longer appears as an exceptional area of bilateral cooperation. 
Although the FTA’s utility as an acute salve for the alliance has been reduced, some argue it could 
help to boost the alliance, over the medium and longer term, by deepening bilateral economic and 
political ties. Entering into an FTA, some argue, is a way to help reorient the alliance to adapt to 
the changes on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia. However, in concrete terms, it is difficult 
to see how the KORUS FTA would make a significant difference in the strategic relationship, as it 
is unlikely to alter either country’s fundamental interests on the Peninsula or in Northeast Asia. 
In contrast, while the passage of the KORUS FTA is unlikely to have a major substantive impact 
on the strategic relationship, a collapse of the KORUS FTA would probably have a profound 
symbolic effect, particularly upon the way South Koreans view the alliance. If the KORUS FTA 
is rejected or subjected to a prolonged delay by the United States, it would be a psychological 
blow to many South Korean policymakers, many of whom would likely see it as a betrayal. This 
would be particularly true since, in their eyes, they made politically costly concessions on autos, 
beef, labor, and the environment to help ensure the agreement would be more favorably received 
in the U.S. Congress. The KORUS FTA’s failure in the United States, according to some Korean 
politicians and policymakers, would lend credence to arguments in South Korea that the U.S. 
commitment to Korea and Northeast Asia is declining. If these perceptions take hold, it would 
increase the political costs of South Korean leaders’ taking unpopular decisions on behalf of the 
alliance, such as increasing South Korean payments for relocating U.S. troops on the Peninsula. If 
the KORUS FTA is rejected or delayed in the United States, U.S. policymakers could attempt to 
somewhat ameliorate the negative symbolic effects in South Korea by taking high profile steps to 
expand U.S.-ROK strategic, rather than economic, relations. 
President Obama’s June 26 announcement to commit his Administration to the KORUS FTA 
occurred as strategic relations between the United States and South Korea have become deeper 
and broader. Cooperation between the two allies over North Korea policy, already at a high point, 
has grown even closer since the March 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, the 
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Cheonan, in waters disputed by North and South Korea has dominated the news. A multinational 
investigation team led by South Korea determined that the ship was sunk by a North Korean 
submarine. The growing affinity between the Obama and Lee Administrations also has been 
illustrated by U.S. backing for South Korea’s successful bids to host the G-20 summit that took 
place in Seoul in November 2010 and the second international Nuclear Security Summit 
scheduled to take place in 2012.  
The President accompanied his KORUS FTA statement by announcing, with President Lee, a 
bilateral decision to delay abolition of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (headed by the 
U.S. commander in Korea) and creation of separate U.S. and South Korean military commands. 
This transfer, which was proposed by President Lee’s predecessor, was to have taken place in 
2012. Upon the request of the Lee Administration, it is now scheduled to occur in 2015. Some 
South Korean critics of the KORUS FTA have wondered whether the U.S. willingness to delay 
the transfer of command will mean that the Lee Administration will be more willing to 
compromise in future discussions over the KORUS FTA details.153 
Implications for U.S. Trade Policy and U.S. Asia Policy 
On the KORUS FTA and other trade-related issues, President Obama faces competing pressures. 
On one side, are those, including business community representatives and pro-trade Members of 
Congress, who view the KORUS FTA as an important opportunity for the United States to 
increase trade and investment with an important East Asian market and ally. They also are 
concerned about U.S. manufacturers and investors losing out to the their EU competitors if the 
EU-Korea FTA enters into force before the KORUS FTA. On another side, are those who have 
argued that the KORUS FTA does not sufficiently address South Korean barriers to imports of 
manufactured goods, particularly cars and some appliances, and these deficiencies would have to 
be fixed before a bill could pass Congress. The Obama Administration, including the President 
himself, has expressed such views and has indicated that they are in the process of seeking 
solutions.  
The KORUS FTA faces even deeper opposition from those who are skeptical about the benefits of 
FTAs, in general, at least as pursued under current trade policy. Much of this opposition comes 
within the Democratic Party in Congress and is manifested in legislation, the TRADE Act of 
2009, (H.R. 3012 (Michaud), S. 2821 (S. Brown)) introduced in the 111th Congress. At this 
writing, the House bill has 136 co-sponsors and the Senate bill has 6 co-sponsors. Each bill calls 
for a review of KORUS FTA and the other two pending agreements to ensure that U.S. interests 
are served and also calls for review of some FTAs already in force, and would subject them to 
possible renegotiation if they are deemed failing to serve U.S. interests.  
But as of early December, the modifications appear to have accomplished their primary objective. 
They have shifted the politics surrounding the KORUS FTA debate in the United States, where 
the original agreement was encountering strong resistance and without fundamentally altering the 
politics in South Korea, where the agreement has broad support. Shortly after the announcement, 
a number of U.S. groups and individuals who had previously opposed the agreement, including 
several Members of Congress, announced their support. In South Korea, the modifications do not 
appear to have shifted the terms of political debate over the FTA, which generally has been 
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expected to be approved by the National Assembly. Most South Korean media commentators 
have observed that the balance of concessions in the December deal were in the United States’ 
favor, a dynamic that the agreement’s opponents have seized upon as another reason to criticize 
the FTA. In contrast, South Korean supporters of the agreement appear to accept the concessions 
as regrettable but tolerable. 
The fate of the KORUS FTA could affect U.S. efforts to institutionalize its economic presence in 
East Asia, a goal the Bush Administration pursued in part through FTAs. In addition to the 
KORUS FTA, the United States has an FTA with Singapore. The Bush Administration initiated 
FTA negotiations with Malaysia and Thailand, but they ultimately stalled. In November 2009, 
President Obama announced the United States would enter into negotiations on a Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, a trade liberalization negotiation among Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. Some observers worry that the 
TPP negotiations, which began in March 2010, could assume a higher priority for the 
Administration than the economically more significant KORUS FTA.154  
Since the early 2000s, U.S. use of FTAs in Asia also has been a proposed response to the plethora 
of bilateral and multilateral FTAs that are being negotiated in the region. None of the actual or 
proposed multilateral agreements include the United States. Failure of the KORUS FTA could be 
viewed as a serious blow to the U.S. “competitive liberalization” strategy. With FTAs throughout 
East Asia proliferating, a failure of the KORUS FTA to be implemented would also likely mean 
that the United States would be shut out of regional economic groupings in East Asia. In contrast, 
the implementation of the KORUS FTA could spark interest of other East Asian countries, such as 
Japan, to negotiate FTAs with the United States in order not to lose their share of the huge U.S. 
market to South Korea. Thus, if the proponents of the “competitive liberalization” argument are 
correct, the fate of the KORUS FTA could play an important role in accelerating or decelerating 
the move to open market regionalism in East Asia. 
Similarly, the fate of the KORUS FTA is likely to be seen as a bellwether for broader U.S. trade 
policy, which is now in a period of re-evaluation. In addition to the KORUS FTA, U.S. FTAs with 
Colombia and Panama are pending. The Doha Development Agenda round in the WTO is, for all 
intent and purposes, on life support. This raises questions in the minds of U.S. policymakers and 
other experts, regarding the future role of the WTO and multilateral negotiations in shaping the 
international trading framework. The KORUS FTA will likely play a role in this reassessment. 
For better or worse, its rejection or indefinite delay might call into question the viability of FTAs 
as a serious U.S. tool to strengthen economic ties with major trading partners. 
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Appendix A. South Korea’s Rules on Imports of 
U.S. Beef 
On April 18, 2008, U.S. and South Korean negotiators reached agreement on the sanitary rules 
that Korea will apply to beef imports from the United States. It allows for imports of all cuts of 
U.S. boneless and bone-in beef and other beef products from cattle, irrespective of age, as long as 
specified risk materials known to transmit mad cow disease are removed and other conditions are 
met. However, to address subsequent Korean concerns, both sides revised this deal on June 21, 
2008, to limit sales of U.S. beef from cattle less than 30 months old. 
South Korea quickly published rules to put this agreement into effect, and began to inspect U.S. 
beef shipments. The U.S. Department of Agriculture similarly began to implement a new program 
to verify that the beef sold is processed from cattle under 30 months old. U.S. beef exporters have 
since worked to recapture a key overseas market.  
In 2003, South Korea was the third-largest market for U.S. beef exports, prior to the ban imposed 
after the first U.S. cow infected with mad cow disease, or BSE (bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy), was discovered. Korea’s commercial significance is reflected in the position 
taken by some Members of Congress, who have stated that congressional consideration of, and 
support for, the KORUS FTA depends upon South Korea fully opening its market to U.S. beef. 
While the U.S. beef industry and U.S. policymakers welcomed the initial April deal, Korean TV 
coverage of the issue and Internet-spread rumors that questioned the safety of U.S. beef resulted 
in escalating protests and calls for the beef agreement to be renegotiated or scrapped. U.S. 
officials countered that measures already in place to prevent the introduction of BSE in U.S. 
cattle herds meet international scientific standards. To address mounting public pressure, the 
Korean government twice pursued talks with the United States to find ways to defuse public 
concerns without “renegotiating” the beef agreement. In late June 2008, both governments 
confirmed a “voluntary private sector” arrangement that allows Korean firms to import U.S. beef 
produced only from cattle less than 30 months old. Both viewed this as a transitional step until 
Korean consumers regain confidence in the safety of U.S. beef. 
Under this arrangement, exports of U.S. beef (including bone-in cuts) to South Korea resumed in 
mid 2008, and by year-end reached almost $300 million, more than one-third of the record 2003 
sales level. In 2009, with the drop off in beef sales worldwide due to the economic recession, U.S. 
beef sales to Korea fell to $216 million. For 2010, sales more than doubled over the previous year 
to reach $518million.155 Though Australia is the main competitor, U.S. beef exporters have gained 
noticeable market share since the Korean market reopened. The U.S. share (in quantity terms) 
rose from 15% in 2008, 26% in 2009, to 32% in 2010 (compared to 69% in 2003). Promotional 
efforts to rebuild consumer confidence in U.S. beef, aggressive marketing efforts by large store 
chains, and much lower retail prices for foreign than for Korean beef, account for the continued 
growth in U.S. beef sales in Korea.156 
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Obama Administration officials, following the President’s June 26, 2010, announcement of his 
decision to present the KORUS FTA to Congress, stated their intent was to resolve the beef and 
auto issues with South Korea by November 2010 once consultations with Congress and 
stakeholders were complete. In the negotiations concluded on December 3, 2010, the beef issue 
reportedly received little discussion as both sides focused on revising the auto provisions. 
President Obama, in discussing the supplemental agreement, indicated that the United States will 
continue to work toward “ensuring full access for U.S. beef to the Korean market.”157 
Congressional reaction on the outcome of the beef issue was mixed. Senator Baucus (chairman of 
the Senate Finance Committee), who has advocated for full access for U.S. beef irrespective of 
the age of cattle in accordance with international scientific standards, expressed “deep 
disappointment” that the supplemental deal “fails to address Korea’s significant barriers to 
American beef exports.” He stated his commitment to right “this wrong” and to work with the 
Administration to ensure that ranchers “are not left behind.” More recently, Baucus said he will 
not support the KORUS FTA until South Korea opens up its beef market. A few other Senators, 
though concerned with the lack of progress on beef, viewed the deal positively and welcomed the 
prospect for considering the KORUS FTA in 2011.158 Meat industry groups expressed support for 
this trade agreement that they expect over time will significantly increase their exports to South 
Korea, and urged Congress to move quickly to ratify it. Beef interests, also supportive, called for 
continued efforts to secure full market access.159  
Memories of the size and intensity of the 2008 anti-beef agreement protests in South Korea 
appear to have directly influenced the position taken on the beef issue by Korean negotiators. 
Reflecting this political sensitivity, they reportedly rejected any discussion on this matter in the 
negotiations held in early November leading up to the summit between Presidents Obama and 
Lee and in the final talks leading to the supplemental agreement. Their position was that this issue 
“did not fall under” the FTA concluded in 2007. Since then, South Korea’s trade minister has 
confirmed that there will be no more discussions on ending the age limits of U.S. cattle 
slaughtered for beef. This stance was more recently affirmed by its ambassador to Washington in 
late January 2011.160 The outcome appears to have been successful in that it has not altered the 
political debate expected to occur in South Korea on the KORUS FTA. However, if changes had 
been made to the terms of current U.S. beef access, opponents would have been given an opening 
to shift the debate on the agreement.  
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Appendix B. South Korean Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturing 
South Korea came late to the table of major motor vehicle manufacturing nations. Government 
attempts to foster a domestic automobile industry began in 1962 when the South Korean 
government enacted the Automobile Industry Protection Law, with assembly line production of 
automobiles in Korea beginning that year using complete knock down kits imported from 
Japan.161 The 1980 edition of the Automotive News Market Data Book, an authoritative industry 
source, listed no South Korean company among the top 50 global producers. By 1988, according 
to the same publication’s 1990 edition, total South Korean car and truck production exceeded one 
million units. By 2009, according to the International Organization of Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers, total South Korean production of cars and commercial vehicles was given as 3.5 
million units, which ranks South Korea as the global number five national producer, behind, in 
order, China, Japan, the United States, and Germany. Yet, South Korea remains only a mid-level 
consumer of motor vehicles. Its domestic sales of 1.3 million ranked its market not only well 
behind the top three leading producers, but also behind each of the five largest western European 
nations, plus Russia, Brazil, India, and Canada, and just ahead of Mexico. Exports account for 
about 60% of Korea’s motor vehicle production volume, a figure that is matched by no other 
major motor vehicle producing country. 
South Korea has aggressively developed and protected its automotive manufacturing base. Motor 
vehicle imports were prohibited in South Korea until 1987, and imports from Japan were banned 
until 1999.162 Originally the South Korean government promoted the development of a fleet of 
domestically owned producers, but this strategy failed. In the shakeout after South Korea’s 
economic crisis of 1997-98, only one major South Korean-owned company was left, Hyundai, 
which also took control of the number-two producer by volume, Kia. Others were marginalized, 
out of the business altogether, or controlled by foreign companies. Korea’s third producer, and 
their only other major manufacturer left in the business, Daewoo, is now controlled by General 
Motors.163 The lone major South Korean-owned producer, the Hyundai-Kia combination, in 2009 
produced 4.2 million vehicles worldwide, ranking it fifth globally.164  
Hyundai is a world-class global competitor, with current and planned assembly operations in the 
United States, the European Union, and other countries. The export orientation of the South 
Korean motor vehicle industry, the quality of South Korean cars, and the relatively low U.S. tariff 
on all imported motor vehicles, except trucks, has made the United States a good market of 
opportunity for South Korean automobile exports. Currently, the United States imposes a 2.5% 
duty on imported passenger vehicles and a 25% duty on trucks. South Korean auto makers 
exported many more cars to the United States than U.S. car manufacturers export to South Korea. 
Total South Korean motor vehicle exports to the United States peaked at more than 860,000 units 
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in 2004, according to U.S. Commerce Department data, and have dropped every year and were 
down to 475,000 passenger cars in 2009 (see Figure 1). Falling imports from South Korea 
probably were affected by two factors: the collapse of the U.S. auto market and increased 
production by South Korean automobile manufacturers in the United States. U.S.-based 
automobile exporters, which could include South Korean and other foreign-owned manufacturers, 
shipped more than 13,600 passenger cars and light trucks to South Korea in 2008 and this figure 
was down to some 7,700 cars and light trucks in 2009.165 
Figure 1. South Korean Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Exports 
to the United States 
2004-2009 
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Transportation and Machinery. 
Another important development affecting automotive exports and imports are the investments 
South Korean automakers have made in the U.S. market since the mid-2000s. Hyundai and Kia 
have established production facilities in the United States. Thus, Hyundai’s Montgomery, AL, 
plant and Kia’s West Point, GA, facilities allow them to substitute for some imports. In 2009, 
Hyundai sold approximately 200,000 cars in the United States, which were built at its Alabama 
factory.166 Kia has also begun to assemble automobiles in the United States from U.S. and 
globally sourced parts. At the end of 2009, the first U.S.-built Kia vehicle rolled off its production 
line.167 By September 2010, 100,000 Kia Sorento’s were produced at the Georgia manufacturing 
facility.168 At full capacity, the Georgia Kia plant will be able to produce 300,000 vehicles. 
Meanwhile, GM Daewoo Auto & Technology (GMDAT), which is the South Korean arm of U.S. 
automaker GM, builds and sells cars in South Korea. In 2009, GMDAT sold nearly 115,000 
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domestically built cars.169 Since these vehicles are not exported they are not covered by the free 
trade agreement.  
The total value of South Korean automotive exports to the United States, including parts, was 
$8.3 billion in 2009, compared to U.S. exports of similar products to South Korea of $462 
million. Thus, the bilateral trade deficit in autos totaled $7.9 billion in 2009, which comprised 
nearly three-fourths of the total U.S. trade deficit with South Korea. This compares to much 
higher deficits earlier in the decade of $11.7 billion in 2006 and $11.2 billion in 2007, but up over 
the long term from a deficit of $5.5 billion in 2000, and $1.5 billion in 1990.170 Through 
November 2010, the U.S. auto sector trade deficit with South Korea was $7.6 billion, up from 
$5.5 billion over the same period in 2009. One analyst who examined the effects of the proposed 
FTA, found in simulation models of projected market changes, South Korea would always gain 
relative to the United States from bilateral liberalization, “because Korea has a comparative 
advantage over the United States in the automobile sector; in other words, Korea has been much 
more successful in accessing the U.S. market than the United States has been in accessing the 
Korean market.”171 
Through aggressive and successful marketing, Hyundai and Kia together have significantly 
increased U.S. market share between 2008 and 2009, despite the overall downturn in U.S. light 
vehicle sales. Both brands saw a jump in their U.S. sales (for Hyundai sales of both their domestic 
and imported vehicles increased by 8% from 2008 to 2009 and Kia’s car and light truck sales 
were up by 10% during the same time period), even while overall sales of U.S. light vehicles 
declined by 21% in 2009 compared to 2008. Their share of the U.S. market jumped from 5.1% in 
2008 to 7.0% in 2009. By comparison, sales of Chevrolet’s Aveo model, which is imported from 
South Korea, fell by 30% between 2008 and 2009.172 Stronger U.S. sales growth have been 
recorded in 2010 for all major automakers, including Hyundai-Kia, which combined increased 
their U.S. sales for the first 11 months of 2010 by 17% compared to the same period in 2009, with 
sales of over 550,000 cars in the United States.173  
South Korean policies that allegedly restrict imports of foreign-made motor vehicles have been a 
major target of U.S. trade policy. In 1995 and 1998, the USTR negotiated memoranda of 
understanding (MOUs) with South Korea, aimed at reducing formal and informal South Korean 
policies that were said to discriminate against imports of U.S.-made vehicles and other foreign 
imports. U.S. policy primarily focused on motor vehicle taxation policies and South Korean 
motor vehicle standards, which supposedly did not conform to international standards, or those 
widely used in major markets.174 The import share of the domestic market in South Korea has 
increased since the MOUs were signed. According to data from the Korea Automobile 
Manufacturers Association and the Korea Automobile Importers and Dealers Association, total 
imports grew from a low of less than 1% of the market (5,000 units) in 2000 to almost a 5% 
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market share by 2009 (61,000 units). Together, European manufacturers accounted for 62% of 
imported cars in the South Korean market in 2009 and Japanese manufacturers combined 
comprised another 28%. U.S.–headquartered automakers made up the remainder with a 10% 
share of new imported cars sold in South Korea (i.e., Ford at 2,957, Chrysler at 2,717, and GM at 
466).175  
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